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 There has been independent oversight of law enforcement complaints for over a 
hundred years in the United States, but recent cases of perceived excessive use of force 
by law enforcement officers have thrust independent oversight into the national forefront. 
This thesis set out to discover frameworks, operation methods, and responsibilities of 
independent oversight of cases involving police excessive use of force by researching the 
current structures and practices of oversight bodies across America—how they differ 
from each other, how they are successful—and determining whether there should be a 
national standard. This research includes oversight boards from small, medium, and large 
American municipalities with law enforcement agencies whose ethnic diversity is not 
reflective of their communities. Through the use of a request for information, 12 
independent oversight boards were examined. The research suggests there is no 
consistency across independent oversight boards, no standard for independent oversight 
board frameworks, and no tracking of their efficiency toward organizational or 
academically suggested goals. Nor is there a central repository where lessons learned and 
best practices can be catalogued and distributed. This thesis provides recommendations 
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 Independent oversight boards of law enforcement misconduct investigations are 
often asked to make the complaint process more inclusive by providing mechanisms and 
locations outside of law enforcement facilities to accept complaints and provide non-
police driven feedback on the status and outcomes of complaints. Boards are also used to 
provide an independent voice to hold law enforcement and civic leaders accountable for 
training and disciplining officers when necessary.  
On May 18, 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
recommended the inclusion of civilians in review of officer involved shootings, that 
communities should “define” what form of independent oversight fits their community 
needs, and that the federal government “should provide technical assistance and collect 
best practices from existing civilian oversight efforts and be prepared to help cities create 
this structure, potentially with some matching grants and funding.”1 
Law enforcement in the United States has championed a philosophy of 
community policing at the local, state, and federal levels for more than 30 years. 
Community meetings, a shared desire for safer communities, and working partnerships 
are all part of this philosophy—a philosophy based on the police providing their 
community with the service that it desires and needs. One of the last pieces to be fully 
implemented nationwide into community policing models appears to be independent 
oversight of internal law enforcement misconduct investigations. Although independent 
oversight boards can be found throughout America, they are infrequently used in medium 
and small municipalities.  
A purposive sampling method was used to obtain a representation of boards from 
across the Unites States. This thesis set out to discover frameworks, operation methods, 
and responsibilities of independent oversight of law enforcement excessive use of force 
cases by examining what the current structures and practices of oversight bodies across 
                                                 
1 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice: Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2015), www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf, 26. 
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America, seeing how are they different from each other, how they are successful, and 
determining if there should be a national standard framework. The research includes 
oversight boards from small, medium, and large American municipalities with law 
enforcement agencies whose ethnic diversity was not reflective of their ethnically diverse 
communities. 
From the research, it can be surmised that there is a lack of established national 
framework for what is accepted as oversight at minimum; there are only 
recommendations. There is no established specificity as to what a board must have in its 
framework organizationally, operationally, and written in policy to be consistent with 
other boards across the United States. As a whole, the boards together were found to have 
structures that matched what has been put forth in academic literature. In addition, boards 
are consistent with having governance that established their creation and have 
mechanisms for complaint intake. Also, not only do they all have a part in addressing 
complaints of excessive use of force, they have defined roles as to responsibilities 
directly related to the review or investigation of complaints. In addition, they provide 
avenues for making a wide array of recommendations to the head law enforcement 
executive or city administrator/civic leader. All boards provide some form of feedback to 
their law enforcement agencies to insure complete and thorough investigations have been 
conducted. With the exception of one board, those examined do not have the capability to 
recommend discipline on law enforcement officers who are found committing 
misconduct.  
Results from this research perpetuate findings from the literature review in that 
there was little to be learned on how boards gauge operational success. This may be due 
to a wide range of individual missions and vague goals. Eleven of the 12 boards were 
found not to conduct any type of subjective survey with the end users, the complainants, 
with regard to their feelings towards the inclusiveness, transparency, or thoroughness of 
their case. The research and responses also indicate that there is a lack of a standard 
mission and set of quantifiable goals for oversight nationwide. 
Several research limitations were encountered during this thesis. Research was 
limited due to the lack of an established and available nationally maintained database on 
 xv 
oversight board frameworks, operational goals, and metrics for success. Additionally, the 
research was unable to provide an even mix of independent oversight boards by function; 
nine are review boards, and three have true investigative capabilities. This can be 
attributed in part to scoping criteria addressing ethnic demographics of the police 
departments themselves and budgets. Also inhibiting the research were non-responses by 
boards who received a request for information.  
This thesis provides recommendations based on the research and findings for the 
future of independent oversight. They are as follows: 
• As a response to the lack of a national database of information on 
oversight boards, an area of further development would be to create a 
database of oversight boards that is exhaustive and periodically 
maintained. 
• Research into independent oversight of internal police use of force 
investigations should consider more in depth case studies on a broader 
group of boards, including those from countries with comparable 
governance structures. 
• Research on if the Ideal Police Review System as presented by Dr. 
Douglas Perez in his book on police oversight, Common Sense about 
Police Review, can be used as a model for a national standard for 
independent police oversight.2  
• Future research should consider questioning how social media and the rise 
of body-worn cameras and cellular phone video footage affect 
independent oversight boards. 
The final report from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
recommends, “Some form of civilian oversight of law enforcement is important in order 
to strengthen trust with the community. Every community should define the appropriate 
form and structure of civilian oversight to meet the needs of that community.” 3 
Communities should have a say in how their boards operate, but if the president and 
federal government are going to advocate for oversight, then they should also provide 
sage guidance based on data and research as to what the minimal standard service an 
oversight board performs, how it performs the service, and how success will be 
                                                 
2 Douglas Werner Perez, Common Sense about Police Review (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press, 1994).  
3 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force, 26. 
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measured. If minimal standards are not established on verifiable best practices then, we 
may be addressing this same issue again in 20 years and still only providing 
recommendations instead of refining what has been offered through analysis as a standard 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND  
Independent oversight boards are asked to make the complaint process against 
police officers more inclusive than traditional internal affairs investigations by providing 
mechanisms and locations outside of the law enforcement facility to accept complaints 
and to provide non-police driven feedback on the status and outcomes of complaints. 
Boards are also used to provide an independent voice to hold law enforcement and civic 
leaders accountable for training and disciplining officers when necessary.  
On May 18, 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
recommended the inclusion of civilians in the review of officers involved shootings, that 
communities should “define” what form of independent oversight fits their community 
needs, and that the federal government “should provide technical assistance and collect 
best practices from existing civilian oversight efforts and be prepared to help cities create 
this structure, potentially with some matching grants and funding.”1 Civilian oversight or, 
as it will be referred to in this thesis, independent oversight, can be thought of as a link in 
the chain that can hold police-community relations together and provides complaint 
integrity through independent investigations or review of misconduct complaints. In 
addition, it provides inclusion for the complainant into the process to create a sense of 
procedural justice and to create a culture where police departments can learn from 
complaints and train police officers on proper conduct. 
Independent oversight of internal police investigations of misconduct and 
excessive use of force is not a new concept. It has been used sporadically in communities 
across America since the end of World War II. Unfortunately, independent oversight is 
rarely implemented during periods of harmony. It would appear police oversight boards 
are built and fueled by emotion, perception, and political agenda. Calls for oversight 
during the aftermath of occurrences of perceived police excessive use of force may be 
                                                 
1 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice: Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2015), www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf, 26.  
2 
made without much regard for if or why it works. This can be inferred by establishment 
of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing and its recommendations, which 
were presented on the heels of highly publicized police use of deadly force in Ferguson, 
Missouri, and New York, New York. 
Although independent oversight boards can be found throughout America, they 
are infrequently used in medium and small municipalities. The lack of independent 
oversight in these communities can create a scenario where community members feel 
they have no recourse to stop systemic excessive use of force by police. It is important to 
understand if and why some boards are successful in implementing and sustaining 
independent oversight and to search for a framework for a nationally recognized standard 
for independent oversight implementation. A brief overview of boards nationwide shows 
there is little data collected as to their effectiveness, and no clear requirements for what 
makes an oversight board effective. Both of these deficiencies in data can be due to 
several factors: there is no true definition of what an oversight board is, the operations a 
board should perform, or metrics for the board to meet operational goals. Asking how 
independent police oversight boards measure their efforts toward the goal of establishing 
an inclusive and transparent process that provides law enforcement accountability to the 
community may lead to an output that can be measured and then replicated. Successful 
replication may lead to a minimum standardized oversight framework so that citizens 
across the United States can feel a sense of procedural justice in the excessive force 
complaint process and help to prevent civil unrest. 
Law enforcement in the United States has championed the philosophy of 
community policing at the local, state, and federal levels for more than 30 years. 
Community meetings, a shared desire for safer communities, and working partnerships 
are all part of this philosophy—a philosophy based on the police providing their 
community with the service that it desires and needs. One of the last pieces to be fully 
implemented nationwide into community policing models is independent oversight of 
internal police investigations.  
3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What are the current structures and practices of external police oversight bodies in 
the United States? How are they different, and how are they successful? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is very little data collection or statistical analysis on independent oversight 
boards and their correlation to complainant satisfaction levels, which would allow 
analysis of the board’s effectiveness. The literature on independent oversight regarding 
excessive force can be broken into four sub-literatures: the history of oversight activity as 
it pertains to the historical context in which it arose, the history of oversight boards 
themselves, structural frameworks for oversight organizations, and qualitative metrics for 
defining and measuring effectiveness. Not included in this review is literature on “police 
excessive force” complaints as the term is not universally defined, and the literature is 
vast and is beyond the scope of this research into oversight boards. For purposes of this 
thesis, the term “independent oversight” should be considered synonymous with civilian 
oversight or civilian review. Also for the purposes of this thesis, the term “board” 
includes the terms “committee” and “commission.”  
1. What Is Independent Oversight, and Why Is It Desired? 
Police accountability researcher Dr. Samuel Walker defines independent 
oversight “as a procedure for providing input into the complaint process by individuals 
who are not sworn officers.”2 Several of Walker’s writings and research were cited 
throughout the literature search, as other authors cite his work and claim him as the 
perennial expert on independent oversight. There appears to be two main themes in the 
literature supporting the demand for municipalities to institute independent oversight.  
The first theme is to provide disenfranchised communities with inclusion and 
investigative transparency when filing complaints of police misconduct and abuse of 
police powers. In his article “Race Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight,” 
                                                 
2 Samuel Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 2001), 17.  
4 
professor of urban studies at Cleveland State University, Ronnie A. Dunn evaluates and 
reviews the city of Cleveland, Ohio’s citizen oversight board, which he notes is one of 
the oldest in America. Dunn suggests the primary goal of independent oversight is to 
provide a sense of accountability to the community through a complaint process that is 
open and transparent, a belief Samuel Walker supports as well in his book Police 
Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight.3 Danielle Hryniewicz of the University of 
Western Ontario, London Department of Sociology suggests the need for oversight is in 
part due to current internal misconduct complaint systems not providing reliable and 
transparent checks and balances for citizens against police misconduct.4 Police researcher 
Dr. Douglas Perez of State University New York at Plattsburgh discusses and identifies 
feelings toward police malpractice as a main driving force for communities to desire 
independent oversight. Included in that malpractice are instances of perceived physical 
and verbal abuse, perceived harassment, failure to take appropriate action, and theft.5 
Perez contends, through his evaluation of the Oakland Police Department in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, there were issues with legitimacy perceptions of “self-protecting” 
processes, such as internal police investigations. Additionally, he discusses police 
legitimacy by asserting there was a void in credibility between what the Oakland Police 
Department viewed as a credible internal review system and what the community 
recognized as legitimate review system.6  
The U.S. Department of Justice provides a history on oversight from ombudsman 
programs in the early 1900s through recent boards in its 2000 publication Citizen Review 
of Police: Approaches and Implementation. These boards are given as examples of local 
governments attempting to prevent and bring to light governmental abuses and protect its 
citizens, yet it does not provide a collaborative model for what minimally should be 
                                                 
3 Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, 7; Ronnie A. Dunn, “Race and the 
Relevance of Citizen Complaints against the Police,” Administrative Theory and Praxis 32, no. 4 (2010): 
565.  
4 Danielle Hryniewicz, “Civilian Oversight as a Public Good: Democratic Policing, Civilian 
Oversight, and the Social,” Contemporary Justice Review 14, no. 1 (2011): 14.   
5 Douglas Werner Perez, Common Sense about Police Review (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press, 1994), 22–27. 
6 Ibid. 
5 
included in an oversight board.7 In the report, police researcher Peter Finn suggests 
independent oversight boards can strengthen the veracity of internal police investigations 
and provide a sense of fairness.8  
Perez asserts independent oversight is rarely discussed and challenged in a logical 
or rational manner and that calls for oversight usually comes on the heels of an incident 
in which police and the community have clashed violently.9 This assertion arguably has 
come to light in the recent work and recommendations of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing; Samuel Walker was prominent member of the witness group. 
Walker’s submitted statement to the task force was based not on frameworks for 
oversight but a proposal for “A Respectful Policing Initiative.” 10  Throughout his 
statement, Walker asserts that a discussion on the day-to-day manner in which officers 
interact with the community can have an effect on the community, in particular those 
communities populated by ethnic minorities. Walker concludes his statement by offering 
that the use of hostile language can create psychological damage to the community, 
distrust of law enforcement, and eventually an environment where police contacts can 
escalate an “aggressive behavior on the part of both parties.”11  
Walker is not the only academic who raises concerns related to police misconduct 
towards ethnic minorities. Criminology professors Brad Smith and Malcolm Holmes 
discuss concerns about misconduct and excessive force against citizens of ethnic 
minorities or from impoverished areas. In addition, Smith and Holmes voice specific 
concern regarding agencies whose ethnic diversity does not mirror that of the community. 
They warn that legitimacy, accountability, and transparency may be affected by a lack of 
                                                 
7 Peter Finn, Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2001). 
8 Ibid., xi. 
9 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 124–126.  
10 Samuel Walker, Statement to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Washington 
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2015), 1–3. 
11 Ibid., 2-–3. 
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representation.12 Community policing principles call for the police to be accountable to 
citizens’ needs and desires for service; oversight is thought to be the extension of that 
accountability to ensure complainants of police misconduct are given fair and impartial 
treatment.13 
Concerns over the lack of transparency and trust of the process create an 
environment in which those affected by police misconduct desire an independent review 
of complaints. Richard Jerome, a former police monitor and special master for two 
different civil settlements in Ohio, posits that there are four reasons for establishing 
boards that address transparency and trust: boards are established to provide objective 
review of complaints filed by citizens, give recommendations on police policy and 
practice, be a forum for the public to voice concerns about law enforcement, and to 
improve relationships and trust between the community and police. 14 Walker claims 
independent oversight provides an opportunity for citizens to force transparency and to 
push past any code of silence practiced by officers investigating their own.15 Hryniewicz 
agrees that transparency and independence provide citizens with a sense of procedural 
justice and feelings of inclusion in the process.16 The readings provide a foundation for 
an argument that there is a necessity for oversight boards as an inclusionary mechanism 
for the community as a whole but specifically for those who encounter police 
misconduct. 
The second theme in the literature pushing independent oversight is to curb and 
prevent misconduct incidents. The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement (NACOLE) touts the independent oversight board as an avenue to promote 
public trust in police services and ensure integrity and transparency during internal police 
                                                 
12 Brad W. Smith, and Malcolm D. Holmes, “Community Accountability, Minority Threat, and Police 
Brutality: An Examination of Civil Rights Criminal Complaints,” Criminology 41, no. 4 (2003): 1037–
1038.  
13 Hryniewicz, “Civilian Oversight as a Public Good,” 77–83.  
14 Richard Jerome, “Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight,” in Citizen 
Oversight of Law Enforcement, 1st ed., ed. Justina Cintron Perino (Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 
2006), 24. 
15 Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, 53.  
16 Hryniewicz, “Civilian Oversight as a Public Good,” 78–79.  
7 
investigations.17 In their work, researchers of police power abuse and public opinion 
toward policing, Dr. Liqun Cao and associate Bu Huang cite sociology professor and 
police researcher Richard Lundman, who claims civilian oversight boards could be an 
effective conduit for stemming police misconduct. 18  Officers and the agencies they 
represent are subordinate to the communities they protect through elected officials. 
Walker advocates this subordination is a true representation of policing in a democratic 
society.19  
In an article in the Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, Stephen Clarke, 
through his analysis of the New York City Complaint Review Board, concludes that 
citizen oversight is believed at times to be the tool for elected leaders to use as an inquiry 
mechanism to ascertain there are if systemic issues within a police department that may 
need addressing after a critical incident or crisis occurs.20 There was no disagreement to 
note over this claim during this literature review, though Walker cautions against using 
oversight boards at the whim of political agendas.21  
In a similar vein, Perez argues that political and municipal leadership still must 
maintain a commitment to hold law enforcement executives accountable to maintain a 
proper balance and prevent an agency from answering only to itself when malfeasance is 
present.22 This check and balance of police leadership is crucial to the formation of an 
oversight board and to provide overall control of a police department to the community.23 
Perez also recommends that political and administrative leaders must take two 
                                                 
17 “National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,” National Association for 
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, accessed November 16, 2014, https://nacole.org/about-us/nacole-
code-of-ethics/.  
18 Linqun Cao, and Bu Huang, “Determinants of Citizen Complaints against Police Abuse of Power,” 
Journal of Criminal Justice 28, no. 3 (2000): 204.  
19 Samuel Walker, “The History of the Citizen Oversight,” in Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement, 
1st ed., ed. Justina Cintron Perino (Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2006), 2.  
20 Stephen Clarke, “Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian 
Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails,” Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems 
43, no. 1 (2009): 2–3.  
21 Samuel Walker, “Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight,” in Citizen Oversight of Law 
Enforcement, 1st ed., ed. Justina Cintron Perino (Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2006), 7–10. 
22 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 252–253. 
23 Ibid., 253. 
8 
responsibilities seriously. First, they must support their adept police executives through 
proper budgets, sound legal advice, and political support for the police. Second, they 
must require accountability from the police executives back to the civic leadership and 
the community.24 Perez asserts although this level of political and administrative rapport 
may seem unrealistic, by achieving this, a municipality will receive the police force it 
desires. If members of a municipality desires an accountable police force, they must have 
a supportive and accountable political/administrative framework behind it.25  
2. What Are the Factors to Consider When Establishing an Independent 
Oversight Board? 
Reviewing what pushes the desire for independent oversight leads us to board 
framework parameters that communities and civic leaders should consider when 
establishing their own board. Samuel Walker is again found heavily cited in readings 
within this sub-literature group, and no researchers attempt to invalidate his claim. 
Walker offers communities may need to assess whether or not there are issues needing 
oversight and reasons why it is justified. 26  Subjective goals, such as legitimacy 
(discussed later in this thesis) are unachievable if community needs and metrics are not 
established.  
NACOLE advocates oversight should be independent from the police department. 
Furthermore, the organization argues members should have personal integrity, provide 
transparent yet confidential reporting, and give unbiased treatment of those involved.27 
Perez acknowledges the need for independence, as citizens who are extremely displeased 
with their police contact may be more open with an independent investigator than they 
would with a sworn member of the police department.28 Concerns over to whom an 
oversight board would be loyal may raise concerns for municipalities when discussing 
which department the board reports to and who justifies its budget. Richard Jerome and 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 253. 
25 Ibid., 254. 
26 Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, 57. 
27 “National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement.”  
28 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 262–263. 
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Benjamin Jones of the Los Angeles County’s Office of Internal Review urge civic leaders 
to be cognizant of funding for boards to operate properly.29  
There was little discussion in the literature as to what police agencies should 
consider when facing implementation of an oversight board. In a 2000 article in the FBI 
Law Enforcement Bulletin, Finn points out that outside interference in police 
investigations, lack of understanding of due process, and undue criticism are a short list 
of issues police administrators must face from the board itself.30 Jerome recognizes head 
police administrators must be cognizant of issues with morale, police associations, and 
internal perception. 31  Perez identifies the need to acknowledge and recognize the 
dangerous situations officers are faced with during their deployment, and the realization 
that force may be required to address situations effectively. Police subculture accepts this 
reality, and face another reality in which the citizens they serve may find this behavior 
unacceptable.32  
3. What Different Models of Oversight Are There? 
The literature provides several models for oversight boards, and two main schools 
of thought prevail. Clarke and Finn both suggest there are four main models of oversight 
with a mixture of any of the four creating a fifth.33 Each of the five models has its own 
positive and negative attributes that employing municipalities would use as reference 
when selecting their own board. The models are as follows: 
• Civilian within police department 
• Civilian external supervisory 
• Civilian external investigatory 
• Civilian auditor 
                                                 
29 Jerome, “Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight,” 21; Benjamin Jones, 
“Funding and Staffing,” in Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement, 1st ed., ed. Justina Cintron Perino 
(Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2006), 59. 
30 Peter Finn, “Getting Along with Citizen Oversight,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 69, no. 8 
(2000): 24–26.  
31 Jerome, “Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight,” 32–33. 
32 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 68. 
33 Clarke, “Arrested Oversight,” 11–20; Finn, Citizen Review of Police, vii.  
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• Mixes/hybrid systems34 
Samuel Walker’s belief, from which he claims the above models are derived, is 
that there are just two actual models and then variations thereof.35 His first model is 
investigative: the board takes the complaint, conducts the actual investigation, and 
renders a conclusion. 36  Auditing is a second model wherein the board reviews the 
internal police investigation process and findings to assure fair and complete 
investigations but does not have any part of the actual investigation or say in the 
disposition/discipline.37 Perez’s chapters on independent review and monitoring appear 
to mirror Walker’s beliefs on the two different models of police oversight, but Perez adds 
framework for a third “ideal” oversight board. In his research, Perez suggests a hybrid of 
both a review and investigative system that could address misconduct issues, which he 
calls the Ideal Police Review System (IPRS).38  
4. What Are the Goals, and How Is Effectiveness Measured? 
Goal setting is only mentioned sporadically in texts not written by or that cite 
Walker and/or Perez. Basic goals throughout the readings for independent oversight 
boards point to providing independent review and perspective on investigations, a feeling 
of procedural justice and inclusion in the process, holding police agencies accountable for 
the conduct of their employees, and to curbing and preventing future acts of misconduct 
by seeking out their causes. Jerome offers that goals and limitations need to be clearly 
stated to the community any board serves so that they are known and set at a reasonable 
level. 39  Goals such as integrity, complaint legitimacy, and departmental learning are 
presented by Perez and appear to be the subjective topics some researchers use to gauge 
oversight boards.40 Additionally, Perez presents the following series of questions that 
                                                 
34 Ibid.  
35 Walker, “Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight,” 11–17.  
36 Ibid., 11–12.  
37 Ibid., 14–15. 
38 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 270–274. 
39 Jerome, “Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Citizen Oversight,” 34.  
40 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 82–83.  
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establish a foundation for his belief of what oversight goals should be in order to 
establish whether or not the oversight board is effective in developing information for the 
purpose of future policy development, conveying information and learning to police 
training mechanisms, and investigating and adjudicating specific complaint incidents:41  
• Does the board have integrity? Are the investigations fair, thorough, and 
objective in the eyes of the stakeholders?  
• Do the stakeholders view the board as legitimate? Is there an overall 
perception of openness and cooperation? 
• Does the board deter police malpractice through learning and the 
development of policies?42 
Walker cites Perez when defining his own suggestions for goal setting and 
measuring subjective effectiveness criteria for oversight boards.43 In addition, Walker 
refers to integrity as the investigator and investigation being both thorough and fair. He 
also defines legitimacy as the manner in which the entire process is perceived by all those 
using it. 44  Walker suggests learning can be measured by the extent to which the 
community, policy makers, and the police department accept findings on the root causes 
of misconduct and implement change.45 Setting goals for the oversight board is necessary 
because a lack of direction during swings in political climates, budgets, and program 
management of the boards themselves can affect sustainability.  
Some sources in the literature note concern regarding how boards effectively 
measured success or marked achievement of goals. Cao and Huang claim police 
resistance to oversight, ethnic composition of the department and oversight board, and a 
lack of defined objective goals all appear to impact the effectiveness of an oversight 
board’s ability to be functional and measured.46 Walker and those who positively cite his 
works advocate for the evaluation of effectiveness to be based on the subjective view of 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 252.  
42 Ibid., 72–78.  
43 Walker, “Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight,” 119–120.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Cao, and Huang, “Determinants of Citizen Complaints against Police Abuse of Power,” 210.  
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whether not change is occurring within the police forces that have oversight boards and 
not necessarily changes in rates of substantiated misconduct complaints. Justice and 
legitimacy are evaluated and assessed by the complete system and are not provided 
necessarily by the rates by which officers are found wrong and held accountable. 
Moreover, Smith and Holmes believe that oversight is just another form of police 
accountability to the community and that it does not provide any quantifiable frameworks 
for analysis of statistical effectiveness whether oversight boards have an ability to 
diminish occurrences of police misconduct and excessive force.47 Perez opines that no 
matter the system, those involved have to show a level of integrity and competence for 
oversight to be successful.48 
5. Literature Review Summary 
From this literature review, it would appear there is no established and recognized 
national standard for what police oversight should minimally resemble throughout 
American communities. The lack of a nationally recognized standard may be due, as 
Walker claims, to the lack of empirical research having been performed on the 
quantifiable effectiveness of oversight boards program frameworks on excessive use of 
force—unless the research exists and does not present itself with the search criteria 
used.49 Recent events of suspected police misconduct illuminate this gap in the research. 
It remains to be seen if technology, such as social media, availability of cellular phone 
cameras, and body-mounted police cameras, has any effect on the desire and 
effectiveness of the public’s call for oversight boards. The use of technology for 
monitoring police misconduct is not a new phenomenon, but it is now more readily 
available to the public than it was five years ago, a period in which the much of the recent 
literature reviewed was published.  
                                                 
47 Smith, and Holmes, “Community Accountability, Minority Threat, and Police Brutality,” 17–18.  
48 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 274.  
49 Walker, “Alternative Models of Citizen Oversight,” 17.  
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D. METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis used a purposive sampling method to obtain a sample of 
boards from across the Unites States. Purposive sampling in research is conducted when 
the researcher has definitive and delineated criteria for a population and is searching for 
the “typical case,” or sampling from those who have shown “demonstrable experience or 
expertise” within the intended group being researched. 50  Sampling in this manner 
involves selecting thorough criteria based on suppositions of the subject population.51 
This thesis used homogeneous sampling method to discover frameworks of what has 
worked in establishing independent oversight boards. Homogeneous sampling is a type of 
purposive sampling where answers to the research question are “specific to the 
characteristics of the particular group of interest, which is subsequently examined in 
detail.”52 Concerns regarding this type of research are that it can be affected by research 
bias and, at times, it is difficult to defend against questions of the representativeness of 
the population.53  
The parameters of this thesis are based on discovering what frameworks provide 
program legitimacy to the three main stakeholders: the complainant/community, the 
police agency, and the civic leader. Not included in this research are studies addressing 
correlation or causation of oversight boards on quantitative drops in excessive use of 
force, drops in the amount of complaints, or qualitative surveys and whether or not the 
complainant feels justice was served. These criteria are scoped out of the study in the 
interest of a timely completion of the thesis and because of a current lack of empirical 
study on them.  
                                                 
50 “Nonprobability Sampling,” Web Center for Social Research Methods, accessed February 27, 2015, 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampnon.php. 
51 “Sampling Methods,” University of Pittsburg, accessed February 27, 2015, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~super1/lecture/lec43911/001.htm. 




E. UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II of this thesis documents the data collection and research conducted on 
independent oversight boards. It discusses the rationale behind the scoped selection of the 
boards chosen and the questions asked in the request for information sent to boards. 
Chapter III discusses and analyzes the results of the request for information through 
combination of the answers in themes revolving around board framework, board 
communication processes, and the abilities and responsibilities of the boards. Chapter IV 
provides findings that can be derived from the responses received and research conducted 
outside of the requests for information. In addition, this chapter discusses what is and is 
not being implemented concerning oversight boards that are recommended through the 
literature review. Chapter IV also discusses what appears to be missing in independent 
oversight nationwide. Chapter V concludes the thesis and provides recommendations for 
future research and collaboration to define what a minimum framework for national 
police oversight is. It also discusses a national database for quantitative and qualitative 
data from oversight boards as to their successes and failures, and it questions whether 
further research into frameworks that could be used as the foundation to build a national 





II. DATA COLLECTION 
A. SELECTION OF BOARDS 
According to NACOLE, there are 115 independent oversight boards in the United 
States.54 On its website, NACOLE admits that its list is not exhaustive; yet, this list is the 
largest list located in the research phase.55 This researcher established five criteria for 
inclusion into the population sample to facilitate a manageable group of boards to sample 
and examine.  
The first criterion for inclusion into this research is for the board to have been 
established for more than five years. This provides proof that the board has existed 
through at least one election cycle. The second criterion is that the board had to be either 
an independent review or an independent investigative board. This criterion was used to 
select only boards that addressed citizen complaints and not those law enforcement 
advisory boards that serve other purposes, such as strictly community relations.  
Thirdly, boards had to come from municipalities that had populations between 
100,000 and 1.5 million people. Populations between these two boundaries could provide 
for boards from small, medium, and large municipalities. Population demographics were 
established from 2010 U.S. Census data available as an open source through a search of 
the website census.gov.  
The fourth criterion is that the law enforcement agencies that are overseen by 
boards have a disproportionate number of Caucasian officers to ethnic minorities as 
compared to these percentages in the overall community population. From these 
communities, the boards sampled include municipalities with an ethnic diversity where 
non-Caucasians make up more than 50 percent of the population, based on the 2010 U.S. 
census, and police agencies where Caucasians make up a disproportionate ratio of sworn 
officers as compared to the municipality’s ethnic diversity as reported in the 2010 U.S. 
                                                 
54 “Links to Oversight Agencies U.S.,” National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 




census. Smith and Holmes claim there are those who advocate that an ethnically diverse 
police agency will reduce hostility between police and the community; the converse is 
that without this diversity, an environment for hostility is created.56 An ethnically diverse 
community provides varied experiences with police contact, some of which may create 
an environment where oversight is desired. Dunn suggests that despite negative 
encounters between minorities, the community and law enforcement, we are moving into 
a time in the United States where “full support and involvement of all citizens, regardless 
of race/ethnicity or national origin, working along with law enforcement, are essential to 
the coproduction of public safety and national security.”57  
The fifth and final criterion in this study is that boards have operational budgets 
less than a $750,000 a year and are not in any part funded by the police department’s 
operating budget. This criterion is included as much of the established literature 
recommends oversight boards be independent of police departments, which requires an 
independent budget. The governing body of the oversight board’s budget is a direct 
representation of that independence.  
The selection process for this thesis resulted in the identification of 31 
independent oversight boards from which to request information and discover similarities 
and differences in: 1) their independence from the agency over which they have 
oversight; 2) operating frameworks; 3) employee/volunteer pre-employment 
qualifications; 4) budgets, reporting channels; 5) scope of authority; and 6) reporting 
methods. These samples provided a broad representation of independent oversight boards 
that presumably represents the best practices nationwide and provide a snapshot of the 
state of independent oversight. 
B. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRES  
The list questions provided in Appendix A were used as the request for 
information. The request for information included 19 questions that were used to provide 
answers to pare down the boards for inclusion in the study and to determine what their 
                                                 
56 Smith, and Holmes, “Community Accountability, Minority Threat, and Police Brutality,” 1038. 
57 Dunn, “Race and the Relevance of Citizen Complaints against the Police,” 560. 
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responsibilities are to the complaint process, their responsibilities and capabilities within 
the investigation and adjudication of complaints, and how they communicate findings to 
law enforcement executives, civic leaders, and the community. The questions were 
grouped thematically to provide answers to complete the criteria for inclusion, 
independence of board operations, complaint process, board communications, and 
discipline, punishment, and checks and balances. For this research, it was assumed that 
by applying the criteria to the entire request for information responses, a snapshot of 
boards across America would be provided, presumably representing the best practices for 
municipalities of different sizes and a state of oversight in the United States.  
Contacts with each board materialized through calls to the board. Requests for 
information were sent via e-mail to contacts, starting with the executive directors and 
high-level support staff. The initial emails were sent out the week of April 19, 2015. At 
the conclusion of the research phase, 15 of the 31 boards failed to respond to the request 
for information either by providing a written response or a telephonic response by August 
31, 2015. Of the 15, one board member discussed the organization in general over a brief 
phone call but did not reply to the written request for information.  
Of the 16 requests for information responses received, nine initially fit within the 
criteria established in the research methodology criteria. Those boards oversaw 
complaints for the cities of Boston, Massachusetts (MA); Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North 
Carolina (NC), Durham, NC; Fresno, California (CA); Greensboro, NC; Inglewood, CA; 
National City, CA; Rochester New York (NY); and Long Beach, CA. Of those boards 
that responded, eight were independent external review boards, and one was independent 
external investigative board. The initial criteria on budget and ethnic diversity within the 
law enforcement agencies were expanded to include three more boards into the 
population sample. With respect to the criteria on the ethnic demographics of the police 
departments, Baltimore, Maryland (MD) and Oakland, CA, police departments’ 
percentage of Caucasian officers as a whole were in the minority, as compared to ethnic 
minorities within the same department. The Baltimore and Oakland respective boards 
were included in this sample population though as Caucasians were still overrepresented 
in the police departments when compared to their percentage in the overall community 
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population. In addition, the Oakland Citizen’s Police Review Board is included even as 
approximately 58 percent of the Oakland Police Department is comprised of a 
combination of different ethnic minorities; Caucasians are still overrepresented in the 
police department by 7.3 percent as compared to the community’s overall population. 
Currently, African Americans are underrepresented by 10 percent within its sworn ranks 
driving the Oakland Police Department and the City of Oakland to implement recruiting 
and retention programs specific to African American officers so that the department 
could better mirror its community.58  
With respect to board budgets, upon review, a new ceiling for budgets was set at 
$1.5 million, twice the initial criterion, allowing six boards to be researched further. 
Thus, boards from Oakland, Baltimore, and San Jose, CA, were included in the sample. 
Of the three others that were not included, two did not provide responses before the 
August 31, 2015 cutoff, and one advised in its response that its annual budget was in 
excess of $5,000,000.59  
Agencies that did not respond to the request for information were only excluded 
from inclusion after searches of their public websites could not reveal enough 
information to determine if they met the criteria for inclusion. Agencies that answered the 
request for information by providing links to their websites necessitated further research. 
Because of this further research, searches were conducted on all 12 of the boards’ 
websites. During this research, information was located completing two requests for 
information. Also located on each website was a statement that each agency provided 
some form of written responses and recommendation at the conclusion of its 
review/investigations. Of the 12 boards, six were found to provide either an annual or 
semi-annual report documenting the number of cases they reviewed and their 
recommendations and findings via a public website. The 12 boards examined in this 
research are provided in Table 1 and included in Appendix B. 
                                                 
58 Sean Whent, Oakland Police Department African American Recruitment Efforts (Oakland, CA: 
City of Oakland, 2015).  
59 Erick Baltazar, response to request for information, San Francisco, California, San Francisco Office 
of Citizen Complaints, April 22, 2015.  
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Table 1.   Boards Examined 
Board Municipality 
Civilian Review Board  Baltimore, MD  
Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel  Boston, MA  
Citizens Review Board Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 
NC 
Civilian Police Review Board Durham, NC 
Office of Independent Review Fresno, CA 
Complaint Review Committee Greensboro, NC 
Citizen Police Oversight Commission Inglewood, CA 
Citizen Police Complaint Commission Long Beach, CA 
National City Community and Police 
Relations Commission  
National City, CA,  
Citizens’ Police Review Board Oakland, CA 
Civilian Review Board Rochester, NY 











 This thesis refers to boards by the name of their parent municipality to avoid 
confusion as many boards have similar names and acronyms. Responses from the 
requests for information were compiled and then grouped by theme. Those themes are: 
criteria based questions, independence based questions, complaint process, board 
communications, and discipline/punishment/checks and balances. Appendices C through 
G provide responses and research located by theme, question, and agency.  
A. CRITERIA-BASED QUESTIONS 
As discussed in the methodology section of Chapter I, the questions were used to 
establish a final population of boards to research and from which to request information. 
Questions regarding budgets, year established, legislation, and the ethnic diversity of the 
law enforcement agency were used to provide a sample of boards from across a broad 
spectrum of communities in the United States. Answers to these questions are provided in 
Appendix C.  
Of particular note was the diversity of the law enforcement agencies. Samuel 
Walker asserts in his text Police Accountability that impoverished persons of ethnic 
minority receive the lion’s share of law enforcement excessive use of force, and the 
excessive use of force issues in these communities is “primarily a problem in race 
relations and is one of the most volatile aspects of the national race crisis.” 60  The 
literature on police oversight addresses procedural justice and inclusion of ethnic 
minorities into the complaint process. As mentioned in the literature review, criminology 
professors Brad Smith and Malcolm Holmes voice concern that a lack of representative 
ethnic diversity in a law enforcement agency may affect how legitimate communities 
view that agency as a whole.61 It would appear also that issues stemming from use of 
force are often correlated with the fact that the officer and suspect were of different 
                                                 
60 Walker, Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, 4. 
61 Smith, and Holmes, “Community Accountability, Minority Threat, and Police Brutality,” 1037–
1038.  
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ethnicities, often Caucasian and African American respectively. These interactions often 
create an environment where the ethnic diversity of a police department can be 
highlighted as a concern. Through the criteria-based questions, it was discovered that all 
of the law enforcement agencies that are overseen by the researched boards have (by 
percentage) more Caucasian officers than Caucasians represented in the municipalities 
overall population. Of the 12 boards sampled, the mean overrepresentation of Caucasians 
in the law enforcement agencies to their representative population in the community was 
18 percent. Oakland, CA, not only had a 7.3 percent overrepresentation of Caucasians, 
but it was also addressing a 10 percent underrepresentation of African American officers 
through the implementation of recruiting and retention programs specific to African 
American officers so that the department will better mirror its community.62  
Douglas Perez believes budgets are key when addressing the basic function of 
complaint intake.63 Budgets for the surveyed boards varied from no budget to a budget of 
$1,249,223. Six of the 12 boards have budgets that were less than $50,000. These six 
boards had lesser budgets compared to the six with budgets over $50,000 because their 
boards are primarily volunteer staffed, and any administrative duties are ancillary for an 
employee in addition other employment responsibilities. The six boards that have budgets 
higher than $50,000 appeared to pay personnel specific to the boards’ operations and 
investigation capabilities. Budgets in Fresno and Rochester include provisions for paid 
administrative staff, specifically for the management of their external review oversight 
boards. Budgets in San Jose and Oakland are over $1.2 million each and minimally 
provide for a greater level of fulltime staff. It would appear that the less a board is 
dependent on volunteers, and the more it conducts its own investigations and provides 
feedback to stakeholders, the higher its budget amount is. Benjamin Jones of the Los 
Angeles County Office of Internal Review suggests, “Adequate and independent budget 
and staff are essential to the effective and efficient operation of an independent oversight 
                                                 
62 Whent, Oakland Police Department African American Recruitment Efforts, 6–9. 
63 Perez, Common Sense about Police Review, 260. 
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entity and to the restoration or enhancement of the public’s confidence in law 
enforcement.”64 
Institutional governance through legislation established all 12 of the boards 
reviewed. Legislation provides for the establishment of the board, who it reports to, and 
its functions. Eleven of the 12 boards derived their establishment from local/ municipal 
actions. Only the Civilian Review Board in Baltimore, MD, was established through state 
legislation. Ordinances, resolutions, and bills all also provided for the independence of 
the boards from the law enforcement agencies they oversee. This governance also 
provides for how the boards would be staffed. Eleven of the 12 boards make use of 
volunteer commissioners or board members; Fresno, CA, is the outlier. Benjamin Jones 
argues that for oversight boards to be effective, volunteers must receive adequate and 
relevant training. 65  Oakland, CA; Boston, MA; and Rochester, NY, provide their 
volunteers with training or require they have in-depth experience in the criminal justice 
system or judicial system.66 Generally, volunteers from the boards sampled are picked 
and confirmed from the community by civic leaders with minimal representation from the 
law enforcement community. 
B. INDEPENDENCE-BASED QUESTIONS 
Independence based questions were themed together to illustrate the necessity of 
boards to be structurally and fiscally separate from the law enforcement agency boards 
they oversee. Three of the questions asked pertained to events that spurred the creation of 
the board, how independence is maintained, and the type of oversight the board provides 
(review or investigative). Answers to these questions are provided in Appendix D. Eight 
of the 12 boards provided responses to whether there was an incident that spurred the 
creation of their board. Answers ranged from no specific event or events (e.g., 
                                                 
64 Jones, “Funding and Staffing,” 59. 
65 Benjamin Jones, “Training,” in Citizen Oversight of Law Enforcement, 1st ed., ed. Justina Cintron 
Perino (Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 2006), 51. 
66 “Citizens’ Police Review Board,” City of Oakland, California, accessed August 5, 2015, 
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/CityAdministration/d/CPRB/index.htm; “Community 
Ombudsman Oversight Panel,” City of Boston, accessed July 29, 2015, 
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Greensboro, NC) to a general of desire for oversight (Fresno, CA), to a use of force by a 
Caucasian police officer on an African American male in Inglewood, CA.67 In Durham 
NC it was the culmination of a series of events related to integrity issues of the police 
department Professional Standards Division investigatory process that spurred the 
creation of its Civilian Review Board.68  
Issues with the integrity of law enforcement internal affairs divisions arguably are 
in the background of all oversight boards and can be used as reason to push for 
independence from the overseen law enforcement agency. From the literature reviewed, 
Danielle Hryniewicz posits the need for independent oversight is partly due to internal 
complaint mechanisms not providing reliability and agency transparency against police 
misconduct.69 Eleven of the 12 boards provided answers about how independence from 
the law enforcement agency is achieved. Four boards acknowledge legislation established 
their independence from the law enforcement agencies. Long Beach, CA, and San Jose, 
CA, note that legislation established their independence from the law enforcement 
agency. For example, Long Beach gave information that the City Charter requires its 
independence and that the board cannot even be housed in the same building as the police 
department.70 San Jose, CA, City Ordinance 8.04.020 states, “The police auditor shall, at 
all times, be totally independent and requests for further investigations, recommendations 
and reports shall reflect the views of the police auditor alone.”71 In the response from 
Fresno, CA, it was learned that its Office of Independent Review stands alone from the 
police department, the mayor’s office, the city council, and the city manager in an 
                                                 
67 Alan Hunt, request for information response, Greensboro, North Carolina, Complaint Review 
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attempt to remain apolitical.72 The Rochester, NY, Civilian Review Board provided the 
highest level of independence from its municipality and law enforcement agency as it is 
operated within a non-profit organization, the Center for Dispute Settlement.73 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter I, oversight boards in this thesis 
align in two categories. The first is external review: the board reviews cases that are 
investigated by law enforcement internal affairs divisions for thoroughness and bias. The 
9:3 ratio of external review boards to external investigative boards in this research closely 
mirrors the ratio of boards the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement found at the beginning of this research.74 In some cases, external review 
boards provide recommendations as to additional follow-up investigation or make policy/ 
training recommendations to the law enforcement agencies when it is believed that policy 
or training is cause of a complaint. The second type of board, the external investigation, 
takes complaints and conducts a separate parallel investigation to the internal affairs 
investigation and review of materials from an internal affairs investigation to reach its 
own conclusion as to whether a complaint is valid or not.  
C. COMPLAINT PROCESSES QUESTIONS 
Appendix E lists the answers to six questions themed around the complaint 
process, including the board’s role in the complaint process, the locations where 
complaints are received, the manner in which complaints are filed, types of complaints 
the board has purview over, and the board’s investigative and adjudication processes. 
These questions were asked to determine if there were both common practices and 
individual practices in the manner in which complaints were filed and addressed.  
Answers to what a board’s role is in the complaint process can be placed by into 
three categories: acceptance of complaints and review of all law enforcement internal 
affairs investigations, review of select law enforcement internal affairs complaints as 
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requested and mandated, and acceptance of complaints and conducting a parallel 
investigation to the law enforcement internal affairs investigation. Of these three 
categories, four boards accepted initial complaints but reviewed all law enforcement 
investigations, five did not accept complaints yet reviewed select law enforcement 
internal affairs complaints as requested and mandated by governance, and three provided 
a mechanism for accepting complaints and conducting a parallel investigation to the law 
enforcement internal affairs investigation. Acceptance of complaints is arguably a crucial 
beginning to oversight, as a board can only review and investigate what it is shown. This 
reflects the belief of Perez, who offers that providing multiple locations to facilitate the 
intake of complaints against law enforcement is not only ideal, it is crucial.75 
Those boards that did not accept complaints revealed in their response and on 
their websites that complaints could be filed at police facilities. Boards that accepted and 
conducted parallel investigations ensured communication mechanisms are in place so that 
complaints received by the law enforcement agency are relayed to the board in a timely 
manner and vice versa. Those that conducted parallel investigations also conduct a 
review of any materials discovered in the law enforcement investigation with respect to 
privacy and human resources laws. In cases where information could not be given to the 
board verbatim, it is provided in summary. Perez offers that these separate and parallel 
investigations provide opportunities for both the board and internal investigations 
divisions to do what they do best. This “cross-pollination of ideas” occurs when the board 
can provide a safe environment wherein citizens can feel comfortable filing a complaint 
that will be investigated and police investigators can use their administrative strengths to 
obtain officer statements that are often not complete when taken by boards.76 
Boards that accept complaints did so in a variety of ways. All 12 accept written 
complaints in person at their offices. Seven boards provide mechanisms via their online 
websites or an email system for complainants to file written complaints. In addition, three 
of the 12 boards accept complaints over the phone, two boards allow for written 
complaints to be accepted by fax. Fresno, CA; Oakland, CA; and San Jose, CA, reported 
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the most robust acceptance mechanisms by facilitating complaint acceptance in person at 
their offices, via telephone, online, and traditional mail.77 To note, in the response to the 
number of locations complainants can file, seven boards said persons could file from 
virtually anywhere with the use of the internet and the board’s website. Oakland, CA, 
was the only board that augmented this ability for a person to file a complaint from 
virtually anywhere within the city by “contacting an officer on the street to file a 
complaint.”78 Perez concluded in his 17-year research in 1994 that the best policy to 
follow is Oakland’s practice of requiring “the acceptance of complaints by any and all 
personnel, at the office, over the phone, in the mail, or on the street.”79 Oakland has done 
this now for over 20 years.  
The types of citizen complaints the sampled boards are able to review or 
investigate respectively are based on their governance. At a minimum, all 12 boards are 
able to review or investigate use of force complaints. As mentioned previously in this 
chapter, three of the 12 boards provide complaint investigative capabilities. For instance, 
Baltimore, MD has the ability to investigate complaints of excessive use of force, abusive 
language, and harassment, 80  and Long Beach, CA, can investigate use of force and 
professionalism complaints.81 Oakland, CA, can investigate any violation of the rules 
manual by a sworn member of the Oakland Police Department and “employs a staff of 
investigators who have full access to the information needed to conduct independent 
investigations. The CPRB has subpoena power to call witnesses, obtain documents, and 
seek testimony.” 82 
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Eleven of the 12 boards appear to have no true adjudication process. In its 
response, the board in Oakland, CA, reveals it “conduct[s] a hearing and afterwards the 
board commissioners render a decision. The decision is then presented to the City 
Administrator for final disposition. The City Administrator can concur with the decision 
completely or in part, or not at all.”83 Aside from adjudication, boards in Baltimore, MD 
and Greensboro, NC, have the use of hearings to gather further information as desired. In 
Baltimore, the hearings are held by inquiry boards if they “1) want to hear first-hand 
testimony from a complainant, witness or the accused, 2) need clarification of issue(s), 3) 
desire to ask specific questions of complainant, witness, or accused, or other reasons.”84 
In its response, Greensboro, NC, shares that closed session hearings could be held where 
Complaint Review Committee members could debate the facts, and if they disagreed with 
a part of the investigation, could ask the chief of police to look at the investigation 
personally and reconsider the decision made by the internal investigation. 85 
Communications between boards, the head law enforcement officer of an agency, and 
civic leaders is important to facilitate any needed change within an organization.  
D. COMMUNICATION-BASED QUESTIONS 
Three questions themed around board communications are compiled in Appendix 
F and cover how complaints are analyzed for policy development, police training, and 
whether lessons learned from completed investigations are integrated into any 
departmental training. All 12 boards responded that they each provide reports to either 
law enforcement executives, civic leaders, or directly to the community. Searches of 
board websites revealed seven of the 12 boards provide compiled periodic reports in the 
form quarterly and/ or annual reports. Richard Jerome emphasizes the importance of 
periodic and public reports in Credibility, Impartiality, and Independence in Civilian 
when he asserts:  
Public reports, at minimum annually, are a significant tool in building an 
oversight agency’s credibility. These reports should describe not only the 
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activities of the oversight entity, they should also provide the public with a 
source of information on the complaints trends or patterns, police use of 
force, and other police practices. Annual reports should be disseminated 
widely, certainly to the media outlets in the jurisdiction, and should be 
posted on the Web sites of the both the oversight agency and the police 
department.86 
The periodic reports compile statistics to the numbers of complaints filed, 
misconduct alleged in the complaints, disposition of complaints, and recommendations 
made regarding issues the board identified. The report provided by Durham, NC, is brief 
and provides basic information on attendance of the board members and the Durham 
police internal investigations brought to them for review that lacked sufficient evidence 
to hold an appeal hearing.87 Fresno, CA, states the purpose of its reports is so that “the 
constituents of the City of Fresno see transparency by all parties involved in the review of 
complaints.”88 The Fresno quarterly report provides analysis on positive and negative 
trends in the use of force, allegations, and policy recommendations made to the police 
department. Additionally, Fresno also provides in their report the status of ongoing 
internal affairs complaints under investigation and in what stage of the review process 
they are. This portion of the report provides a summary of whether a case was a use of 
force, as well as the police department’s findings, the board’s disposition, and the status 
of the independent audit and a very brief case study. 89 The report closes by listing 
inquiries with specific allegations and findings that are brought to Fresno’s attention but 
did not warrant a full internal affairs investigation.90  
The annual report provided by Boston, MA provided data on documented 
allegations of misconduct, internal affairs division findings, and board recommendations. 
Of particular interest to measuring success of the investigation process is how its board 
issues one of four findings of an appeal of a Boston Police Department investigation. 
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Findings are based on the panel’s belief whether the investigation is fair and thorough. In 
2014, Boston found 55 percent of all Boston Police Department investigations it 
reviewed as both fair and thorough, 41 percent were thought to be other than fair and 
thorough, and four percent were recommended for further investigations or inquiry.91 
Within this report comes further insight to how recommendations were received by the 
Boston Police Department. Included as an attachment in its 2013–2014 annual report is a 
June 2014 memorandum from Police Commissioner William B. Evans responding to 
recommendations made by the board.92  
Only Baltimore, MD provided in its annual report a metric for measuring success 
toward the goal of complainant satisfaction. This reporting mechanism does not come 
directly from the Civilian Review Board itself but through the Board of Estimates in its 
yearly budget report. The report provides metrics for the number of investigations 
completed, percentage of recommendations made by the board that were reversed by the 
law enforcement agency and a goal for the percentage of citizens satisfied with the 
Civilian Review Board complaint process to be 70 percent in fiscal year 2015.93 
Perez suggests there are three loops that allow boards to provide their findings 
and in return receive feedback to their responses. Moreover, Perez asserts that 
communication loops in policy development, training, and the complaint and adjudication 
processes are necessary for holding law enforcement agencies accountable.94 Reporting 
and communicating findings to law enforcement agencies is accomplished via two 
methods. The boards either reported findings regarding policies or training directly to a 
lead law enforcement officer or to the city manager/civic leader. Greensboro, NC, cites a 
respectful and meaningful ongoing dialogue between the Complaint Review Committee 
and the police department concerning existing police policies, procedures, and processes 
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when discussing the communication of findings.95 In San Jose, CA, as part of the board’s 
duties as prescribed by its establishing ordinance, the board will “file annual public 
reports that include a statistical analysis, documenting the number of complaints by 
category, the number of complaints sustained and the actions taken.”96 The report also 
makes an effort to analyze trends and patterns and provide recommendations based on 
those trends and patterns.97 Fresno, CA; San Jose, CA; and Oakland, CA, were the only 
three of the 12 boards that provided responses affirming that recommendations from the 
board had in fact been accepted and adopted as policy or training by the law enforcement 
agencies.98  
E. DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT, CHECKS AND BALANCES QUESTIONS 
Responses to the three questions from the request for information dealing with 
discipline, punishment, and checks and balances that the boards address are compiled in 
Appendix G. Of the 12 boards only two, Inglewood, CA, and Oakland, CA, provide 
recommendations on discipline.99 Even though boards in Inglewood and Oakland have 
the ability to recommend discipline and punishment, the final decision and ability to 
impose those recommendations is not in their capabilities. It is Walker’s critical view that 
when board recommendations are not binding on law enforcement executives, they 
become, “toothless,” which may lead to a lack of belief in the board.100 The ability to 
impose discipline, punishment, policy changes, and training in all 12 municipalities 
overseen by boards is with either the head law enforcement executive or the lead 
municipal leader (e.g., a city manager or mayor). Through the responses to what manners 
of checks and balances communities by proxy through their oversight boards had against 
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head law enforcement executives ignoring recommendations, five of the 12 have the 
ability to consult with the city manager or administrator about their concerns. Perez 
explains in his chapter on the Ideal Police Review System: 
Police executives must be held directly responsible for the actions, both 
macroscopic and microscopic, of their review systems. To apply this 
accountability to the police chief fairly, one must entrust the chief to 
impose sanctions on those who have been found guilty of misconduct. If 
the police executive cannot be trusted with this responsibility, then the 
solution is for the municipality is clear; get a new chief.101 
The board from Oakland, CA, responded that the its decision is presented upon 
completion to the city administrator who can concur completely, in part, or not at all and 
whose decision is final.102 Final decisions by the city manager are also the check and 
balance in Greensboro, NC, where the board responded to the same question with, “If no 
agreement can be made between the Chief and the Committee, then the case goes to the 
City Manager. The City Manager independently reviews the case and makes a decision. 
That decision is final and closes the case.”103 
Findings based on the research and analyses are discussed in the next chapter. 
Points regarding what is and is not being done nationwide and whether it coincides with 
the established literature are also discussed, along with whether there is any research 
already completed that can be tested to provide this framework. Questions regarding the 
establishment of a national minimum standard framework for oversight are brought 
forward, along with a discussion on the call for oversight in America in light of high-
profile excessive use of force events.  
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IV. FINDINGS 
As a whole, the boards together were found to have structures that matched what 
has been put forth in the academic literature. Boards are all consistent with having 
governance that created them, have mechanisms for complaint intake, have a part in 
addressing complaints of excessive use of force, define roles as to responsibilities directly 
related to the review or investigation of complaints, and provide for avenues for making a 
wide array of recommendations to the head law enforcement executive or city 
administrator/civic leader.  
All of the boards at minimum are able to review or investigate use of force 
complaints. Although use of force complaints appear to be those most sensationalized 
complaints in the media, according to the 2010 National Police Misconduct Statistics and 
Reporting Project (NPMSRP) Police Misconduct Statistical Report, they account for only 
23.58 percent of the 4861 complaints tracked by the project.104 This percentage is but a 
small sample of all misconduct in America as the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ only 
method of tracking complaints is using a survey sent to 3336 general purpose local law 
enforcement agencies, wherein only 2,822 of the respondents were used as a collection 
sample. 105  Neither the NPMSRP survey, nor the research conducted in this thesis, 
address the differences in the definition of use of force, provide a standard definition of 
excessive use of force, or if use of force is reported consistently by law enforcement 
agencies across the United States. 
Avenues for complaint acceptance vary with just over half of the boards making 
use of online or email capabilities to accept initial complaints. It would appear that 
Oakland is the only board with which a person could file a complaint with any sworn 
member of the police force with whom they came into contact. This level of 
                                                 
104 “2010 NPMSRP Police Misconduct Statistical Report—Draft,” CATO Institute, last modified 
April 5, 2011, accessed August 22, 2015, http://www.policemisconduct.net/2010-npmsrp-police-
misconduct-statistical-report/. 
105 “Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS), 2007,” Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, last modified May 14, 2015, accessed August 15, 2015, 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=248. 
34 
accountability arguably provides a necessity to remain professional and accept only 
professional behavior from ones colleagues. In addition, Oakland, CA, has implemented 
body-worn cameras on its officers, and the effect of those on the desire of community 
members to complain directly to the officers is yet to be revealed.  
As a whole, boards lack any ability through governance to directly impose change 
that is identified by the board as needed, recommended, and may have been systemically 
ignored. Baltimore through its governance does not have the ability to force discipline, 
but it does have to be consulted before the Baltimore Police Commission can deliver 
discipline on a board reviewed or investigated case.106 Perez suggests that to be effective 
in the long-term, discipline needs to be handed down by those head police executives 
who “understand the population of police officers being policed.”107 This allows the head 
law enforcement executive to be fairly held accountable by the civic leaders, and if the 
executive cannot be trusted to impose the appropriate discipline, he or she can be 
removed from office.  
Only the Rochester, NY Civilian Review Board offered information in its 
response on mediation and conciliation services it provides to the community and law 
enforcement. In addition, Rochester defines mediation and conciliation as “the process by 
which a complainant and an accused officer will sit down with a mediator and attempt to 
settle the matter through discussion,” and if the outcome is not to the satisfaction of the 
complainant, she or he still maintains the ability to file and have the complaint 
thoroughly investigated.108 Conciliation can provide a service to allow the community 
and police to better understand how their actions are perceived and received by each 
other. Perez notes that conciliation services are crucial to review and oversight by 
keeping avenues of communication open between the citizens and officers, young 
officers in particular.109 
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Through independent research and analysis of information provided by the 
boards, it appears there is a lack of measurable organizational goals. As mentioned in 
Chapter IV, Baltimore, MD is the only board that could be found to provide metrics for 
citizen satisfaction with its review board. Walker states one of the assumptions on which 
oversight rests is that it will “provide a more thorough and fair investigation of 
complaints than those conducted by the police themselves.”110 Unfortunately, 11 of the 
boards examined do not show a mechanism for quantifying whether or not the 
complainant feels the investigation was fair and thorough. This raises the question 
whether or not boards are legitimate and useful in the eyes of the community they serve. 
Walker asserts his beliefs on oversight success, stating:  
The relevant question, then, is not whether citizen oversight in general is a 
success or failure but whether particular oversight agencies are successful. 
If none can demonstrate success in some persuasive way, then the entire 
concept is suspect and it would be appropriate to consider alternate means 
of achieving police accountability.111  
Arguably, Walker is providing a discourse for researching successful individual groups in 
order to replicate a standard for oversight.  
Consistent public reporting of board operations, statistics on complaints, and 
posting of recommendations fell short across the boards as only six out of 12 provide any 
periodic report that is easily accessible on their website. A seventh board, Baltimore, 
MD, provided statistical data on the board but that was obtained by contacting the 
Baltimore Bureau of the Budget and Management Research, not the board or the police 
department.  
Unfortunately, results from this research confirm findings from the literature 
review in that there is little learned on how boards gauge operational success. This may 
be due to a wide range of individual missions but not necessarily goals. Investigative 
integrity, complaint legitimacy, and departmental learning are presented by Perez and 
appear to be the subjective topics many researchers use to gauge the effectiveness of 
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oversight boards; however, none of the boards provided information about how their 
individual goals, or goals as presented by Perez and the literature, are attained and 
measured.112 
The missions of the boards appear to revolve around central theme of providing 
independent review or investigation of misconduct complaints for those citizens who feel 
they have a valid grievance, providing independent review of police investigations, 
insuring transparency and thoroughness in investigations, and providing an alternative 
method of filing a complaint on police misconduct. These missions are clearly provided 
on the websites of the boards in Durham, NC, Charlotte, NC, Fresno, CA, and Boston, 
MD.113 Additional missions presented by the boards are enhancing policing community 
relations (in Rochester, NY) and “promoting higher standards of competency, efficiency 
and justice in the provision community policing” (in National City, CA).114  
Although not specifically stated as a goal, all boards researched provide feedback 
to their law enforcement agencies to insure a complete and thorough investigation is 
conducted. For example, Fresno, CA, declares, “The mission of the OIR is to strengthen 
community trust in the Fresno Police Department by providing neutral, third-party review 
of police policies, procedures, strategies and internal investigations.” 115 Additionally, 
Fresno “works independently of the Fresno Police Department and provides the City’s 
leaders and the public with objective analysis of policing data, actions and outcomes.”116 
Durham, NC, notes on its website that it is to “Determine whether or not the investigation 
was conducted in an appropriate manner, specifically, whether the police department 
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abused its discretion in the conduct of the investigation.”117 Even though boards may 
have missions establishing what they are doing and for whom they do it, 11 of the 12 
boards researched do not to provide measurable goals for the board to strive toward.  
Through reviewing the research and responses, it can be inferred that there is a 
lack of a standard mission and set of quantifiable goals for oversight nationwide. In his 
book The New World of Police Accountability, Walker explains, “There are no generally 
accepted standards for complaint procedures,” and “some authoritative statements about 
citizen complain procedures exist, but the lack specificity.”118 This lack of specificity is 
carried onto the boards that oversee complaint procedures, arguably creating a scenario 
where there is a lack of standardization from local jurisdiction to local jurisdiction, 
affecting procedural justice for law enforcement as a profession nationwide. Walker 
concludes that the lack of specificity has created a scenario where each oversight board 
establishes its own set of policy and procedures, or, if forced to, a law enforcement 
agency and its parent municipality negotiate into a consent decree overseen by the 
Department of Justice to stem unaddressed systemic issues.119  
From the research, it can be surmised that there is a lack of established national 
framework for what is accepted as minimum oversight, only recommendations. There is 
no established specificity to what a board must have in its framework organizationally, 
operationally, and written in policy for consistency with other boards across the United 
States. Organizations such as the National Association of Civilian Oversight of Law 
Enforcement, the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF), and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) 
may provide recommendations as to what needs to be asked to establish a board, yet they 
all still fall short of defining specifically what makes a board standard.  
PARC claims its conceptual framework, used to recommend the appropriate 
oversight in Eugene, Oregon (OR) in 2005, is the industry standard and has been 
                                                 
117 “Civilian Police Review Board,” City of Durham, accessed July 24, 2015, 
http://durhamnc.gov/ich/cmo/Pages/cprb.aspx. 
118 Walker, and Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability, 108. 
119 Ibid. 
38 
championed by oversight leaders such as NACOLE and PERF. The PARC study focuses 
on 16 boards “with features analogous to Eugene,” examining of their frameworks, past, 
budget, police department complaint processes, and rapports with police departments.120 
In reviewing its study, PARC provides numerous examples of independent review and 
investigative boards and provides a battery of questions that it suggests will provide a 
foundation that helped Eugene piece together its oversight.121 Unfortunately, it does not 
provide a definitive framework in specific, and the report does not discuss how to 
measure success towards organizational goals. Furthermore, PARC’s research does not 
reference the community demographics nor that of its police agencies in its selection 
criteria 
Because there is no established standardization to the complaint process and for 
the frameworks of oversight boards, there is a lack of quantifiable data to show progress 
of board goal achievement or of success of boards toward their missions nationwide. 
With this in mind, if boards were to establish and use quantifiable metrics to gauge 
success for investigations addressed, recommendations accepted/implemented by law 
enforcement, and especially satisfaction, perhaps a better snapshot of the state of 
oversight in the United States could be found. The creation and collection of this data 
would create a scenario wherein data could be compiled on the national level for internal 
law enforcement complaint processes and for the independent oversight of those 
processes.  
As seen from the responses, there have been singular events that were cited as 
spurring the creation of the independent oversight board, which one could deduce is a 
knee-jerk reaction. Perez claims independent oversight “is seldom debated in a rational 
and logical fashion” and that it often happens “during crisis periods in which the police 
have clashed with citizens in violent situations.” 122  Law enforcement officers and 
agencies are often accused of racist behavior, excessive force, and malfeasance, all of 
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which can become the focal points for proponents of immediate implementation of 
independent oversight during these crises.123 
For this research, 45 percent of the boards failed to respond in full to the request 
for information, calls to board leadership, or to requests for information from the law 
enforcement agencies themselves. It is not known why boards did not respond, but one 
could draw the inference that boards were not willing or able to provide the information 
requested. Not all personal contacts were adversarial. The majority of persons contacted 
during the research were pleasant and willing to help locate the most appropriate contact 
with their board. In fact, on four occasions, boards provided contact information for other 
boards they felt could assist in the research. 
Further research can help to fill knowledge gaps by providing what the 
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing calls “evidence-based practices” on 
which successful oversight boards are built.124 Conducting this research could provide a 
basis for future qualitative and quantitative analysis. Researchers should be wary of 
potential variables in oversight board research, such as how each police agency accepts 
complaints, categorizes complaints, categorizes dispositions, the different mechanisms 
for complainants to file complaints, hidden officer misconduct, population and ethnic 
diversity of the municipality and agency.125 Using information requested from selected 
oversight boards and studying their formations and program policies and procedures, 
researchers may be able to replicate a successful ideal system.  
When discussing a national standard for independent oversight boards, the data 
obtained shows that when combined as a whole, responses of the boards researched 
touched on many points that are made in the academic research. Combined, they: offer 
options for maintaining independence from the overseen law enforcement agency, offer 
methods for obtaining and training board members and investigators, provide multiple 
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avenues for complaint acceptance, provide the ability for completed complaints to be 
reviewed or investigated, and provide mediation and conciliation services. As a group, 
board findings are reported to the community and head law enforcement executive 
through recommendations regarding changes in policy, procedure training, and discipline 
that law enforcement executives still have the power to reject; however, this is 
counterweighted by the civic leader’s ability to remove the law enforcement executive 
from office if systemic or high profile incidents are not addressed.  
It would appear that independent oversight should be accepted as a piece of an 
overall community policing philosophy and not a panacea for addressing all claims of 
police misconduct or for bolstering a political agenda. Current literature and research on 
the effectiveness of citizen oversight boards from scholarly journals, trade journals, and 
published books appear to be based primarily on subjective analysis of the personal 
feelings of effectiveness for those who use the system for a transparent review of their 
complaints. Perhaps it is time for the academic community to quantify whether justice is 
prevailing by implementing independent oversight and if law enforcement agencies are 
learning from the accused and identified misconduct and mistakes of police officers. 
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V. LIMITATIONS, FURTHER RESEARCH, AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
The research was unable to provide an even mix of oversight boards by function 
as nine are review, and only three have true investigative capabilities. This can be 
attributed in part to scoping criteria addressing ethnic demographics of the police 
departments themselves and budgets. Without those criteria alone, boards that oversee 
and review San Francisco City and County, CA; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (PA); 
Washington, DC; Honolulu, Hawaii (HI); and Detroit, Michigan (MI), may have been 
researched and included as well. Also inhibiting the research were non-responses from 
boards. For the timeliness of this thesis, boards were emailed twice and called twice 
during the initial research phase starting April 19, 2015. Follow-ups were conducted with 
boards that responded. August 31, 2015, became the cut-off date for any requests for 
information or reception of related correspondence.  
Missing from this research is why none boards researched have implemented a 
framework, such as Dr. Douglas Perez’s Ideal Police Review System (IPRS), or if they 
even know of its existence. The initial intent of this research was to validate the IPRS 
model through existing independent oversight boards, but the research did not reveal the 
IPRS implemented within an oversight board in whole or by name in the United States. 
Collectively, the research provides methods of providing measures of efficiency and goal 
achievement through the use of quantitative statistics and qualitative questionnaires about 
satisfaction levels. What has just been described is in essence what Perez argues an 
independent oversight board should do and accomplish when he describes his IPRS.126 It 
stands to reason that if collectively boards across America are doing all of the functions 
of the IPRS, then perhaps more consideration and research should be performed to test 
whether the IPRS can be a baseline for what an independent oversight board is, does, and 
achieves. Other challenges the IPRS faces are: research specifically forwarding Perez’s 
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assertions has not been published since 1994 when the IPRS was published, persons 
involved in independent oversight may not widely acknowledge the existence or validity 
of the IPRS, and initial architects of existing oversight boards established since 1994 may 
no longer be involved with their boards.  
This research was also limited due to the availability of a nationally maintained 
database on oversight board frameworks, operational goals, and metrics for success. The 
NACOLE website provides a library of information on independent oversight; however, 
one may question its recommendations, as it is the association for civilian oversight of 
law enforcement, just as one would for an association of law enforcement agencies who 
band together for the purpose of protecting the rights of law enforcement officers during 
internal affairs investigations.  
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH  
As a response to the lack of a national database of information on oversight 
boards, an area of further research and development would be the feasibility of a database 
of oversight boards that is exhaustive and periodically maintained. NACOLE provides an 
in depth listing of boards, but it does caution that this list is not exhaustive.127 Such a 
program could establish a warehouse of quantitative and qualitative data on operations, 
successes, and failures of independent oversight boards. A national database may also 
provide a view of excessive force and board responses nationwide provide for an industry 
best practices database with lessons learned, and it could also provide a minimum 
framework for what should be included in an excessive use of force oversight board to 
provide standardization across America.  
Research on independent oversight should consider more in-depth case studies on 
a broader group of boards provided by the National Association for Civilian Oversight of 
Law Enforcement and oversight boards in countries with similar local law enforcement 
governance structures as the United States. Further research and case studies could do 
well to research qualitatively the causes for the establishment of these boards, what the 
                                                 
127 National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, “Links to Oversight Agencies 
U.S.”  
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stakeholders feel about their effectiveness, and how independent oversight can be 
individualized yet maintain a level of standardization. Answers to these questions may 
provide framework for building standards for board goals and operations.  
Social media and the internet are now part of the daily life of an American law 
enforcement officer. Electronic communication is almost a necessity and should be 
respected as such with regard to reporting police misconduct. Future research should 
question how social media and the rise of body-worn cameras and cellular phone video 
footage affect police oversight boards and fit into the workflow of an investigation. Are 
used they in the beginning during the initiation of a complaint, in the middle of the 
investigation, or are they at the end when providing conclusions and recommendations?  
C. CONCLUSION 
This research has looked at the policies and procedures of established independent 
oversight boards of internal police use of force investigations. A population sample was 
established by filtering a comprehensive list of established boards list provided by 
NACOLE through a series of criteria. A population group of boards to research was 
attained by filtering boards from the NACOLE website through five criteria addressing 
organizational age, population, ethnic demographics of communities and their police 
department, and budget.  
Calls to board leaders and executive staff were made to establish points of 
contacts to expedite the research process. An 19-question request for information was 
sent via email to 31 boards that met initial criteria of being in existence for more than five 
years, have populations between 100,000 and 1.5 million people, and have a gross ethnic 
minority population greater than 50 percent as determined by the percentage of persons in 
the 2010 U.S. census who responded as “Caucasian only.” The requests for information 
were crucial in an attempt to establish a relevant population sample of 12 boards. The 
initial desire of the researcher was to have a population sample containing six boards that 
are independent review and six that are independent investigative in nature.  
Sixteen boards responded, with nine initially meeting the full criteria established 
in the research design. The full criteria added stipulations for budgets less than $750,000 
44 
and ethnic demographics of the reviewed police departments to reflect an excessive parity 
between the percentage of Caucasians in the municipality’s population compared to the 
percentage of Caucasians that are sworn law enforcement. The researcher realized that 
the criterion for budget was estimated too low and may have been excluding boards that 
could be included in the population sample. To compensate, the budget criterion was 
doubled to $1.5 million and allowed the inclusion of two boards, one of which responded 
and one that did not. This increase in budget still prevented the city and county of San 
Francisco, CA, from being included in the sample population, as its budget was well over 
$5 million.128 San Jose, CA; Baltimore, MD; and Oakland, CA, were included after 
inclusion criteria on budget and police department demographics were adjusted. In all, 
nine independent review boards and three independent investigative boards were 
researched. The ratio of 9:3 was a more accurate percentage representation than was 
initially desired as it is approximately the same ratio of independent review to 
independent investigative boards provided by NACOLE at the beginning of this thesis.  
It would appear through this research that independent oversight in America is 
working as there is a public call for it, it is being provided as an answer to police 
community relations by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, and as it is 
a measure imposed by the Department of Justice to address systemic use of force issues 
in consent decrees. Boards may continue to operate and thrive as their presence provides 
a means through which the community can be included into the police complaint process 
and perhaps even bolster procedural justice. If for no other reason, independent oversight 
boards from this research appears to do what the literature says one of their primary goals 
is: they provide a second look at police misconduct investigations so that the complainant 
and the community can be assured law enforcement are held accountable and complaints 
are complete and thorough. 
This thesis provides a snapshot into the current state of independent oversight in 
America. Of the boards researched, there were no two boards operating exactly the same, 
but when overlaid, they touch on many points. With that, a case for a national standard 
                                                 
128 Baltazar, response to request for information.  
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for independent oversight could made. If there is not a national standard for independent 
oversight, then communities and law enforcement may not be able to agree consistently 
on the roles and functions that are needed. Without this information, there can be no 
collaboration of best practices nationwide based on what operations are effective and why 
they are deemed effective. Furthermore, without a national standard for oversight boards, 
the data they produce and collect is not readily shared among law enforcement and the 
oversight community. 
The final report from the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 
recommends, “Some form of civilian oversight of law enforcement is important in order 
to strengthen trust with the community. Every community should define the appropriate 
form and structure of civilian oversight to meet the needs of that community.” 129 
Communities should have a say in how their boards operate, but if the president and 
federal government are going to advocate for oversight, then they should also provide 
sage guidance based on quantifiable data as to what a minimal standard of service an 
oversight board performs, how it performs the service, and how success will be 
measured. If minimal standards are not established on verifiable best practices, then we 
may be addressing this same issue again in another 20 years and still providing 
recommendations instead of refining what has been offered through analysis as a standard 




                                                 
129 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force, 26. 
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APPENDIX A.  REQUEST FOR INFORMATION QUESTIONS 
1. What is your annual budget?  
2. When was the entity established?  
3. What is the legislation that provides its structure?   
4. Was there an event, or series of events that spurred the establishment of 
your oversight entity?  
5. How does your entity maintain independence from the law enforcement 
agency over which that it has oversight?  
6. Is your entity an external-review of internal police investigations, or an 
external-investigative, separate, and parallel to the internal police 
investigation? 
7. What is your role in the complaint process?  
8. How does a citizen file a complaint with your entity?  
9. How many different locations does the community have to file 
complaints? 
10. How does your entity analyze complaints for the purposes of future policy 
development for the law enforcement agency?  
11. How does your entity communicate findings and analysis to police 
training mechanisms for their use and dissemination?  
12. Are lessons learned from completed investigations integrated into any 
systemic training in the department?  
13. What capabilities does your entity have to investigate and adjudicate 
specific complaint incidents? 
14. What types of complaints are you able to investigate?  
15. What is your adjudication process? 
16. What discipline/ punishment can your entity recommend?  
17. What discipline/ punishment can your entity impose?  
18. What is the check and balance your entity uses when the head law 
enforcement administrator does not agree with your findings or 
recommendation for discipline or punishment? 
19. Can you please provide the ethnic diversity of your police department 
(Caucasian, Hispanic, African American, etc.)? Where is this information 
publically available?  
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APPENDIX B.  BOARDS EXAMINED 
Entity Municipality 
Civilian Review Board  Baltimore, MD  
Community Ombudsman Oversight 
Panel  
Boston, MA  
Citizens Review Board Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC 
Civilian Police Review Board Durham, NC 
Office of Independent Review Fresno, CA 
Complaint Review Committee Greensboro, NC 
Citizen Police Oversight Commission Inglewood, CA 
Citizen Police Complaint 
Commission 
Long Beach, CA 
National City Community and Police 
Relations Commission  
National City, CA,  
Citizens’ Police Review Board Oakland, CA 
Civilian Review Board Rochester, NY 
Office of the Independent Police 
Auditor 






















$151,749 1999 House Bill 1138, enacted in the 1999 session of the Maryland 
General Assembly established the Civilian Review Board, and 
Senate Bill 616, enacted in the 2000 session expanded its 
authority.133  
City demographics show 31.6% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 48% of 






$50,000 2007 By executive order establishing the Community Ombudsman 
Panel and Complaint Mediation Program CO-OP 
City demographics show 47% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 66.4% 





$0 1997  City council resolution  City demographics show 45.1% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 74.9% 





$0 1998  Session Law 1998-142. “An Act to Allow the City of Durham to 
Disclose Limited Personnel Information to the Members of the 
Citizen Review Board to Facilitate Its Review of Police 
Disciplinary Cases.” 
City demographics show 42.1% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 64.7% 






$150,000 2010  The office was established by a city council ordinance. City demographics show 30% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 48.4% 






$0 2009  The legislation supporting its creation and function is Chapter 12 
of the City of Greensboro Code of Ordinances and NCGS 160a-
168, Chapter 132 and Session Law 2001-20. 
City demographics show 45.6% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 74.4% 




                                                 












$365,864 1932/ 1973 
(revised) 
Police Act of 1932. 1973 Revised Charter of the City and County 
of Honolulu. 
City demographics show 21% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 23.1% 






$0 2011  Referred to entity website. 
By executive order of the mayor.134 
City demographics show 50.5% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 46.7% 






$5,000 2004 The Inglewood Citizen Police Oversight Commission was 
established by city council action.  
City demographics show 2.9% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 37.1% 







$300,000 1990  City Charter Section 1150-1155 City demographics show 46.1% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 
Approximately 53% of force is 
Caucasian. A 6.9% overrepresentation. 
Fire and Police 
Commission 
Milwaukee, WI 
$1,575,664  1885/ 2001 
(revised)  
Established in 1885 by state law. In 1911, the Commission’s 
authority was expanded to include all aspects of operational 
oversight of the Fire and Police Departments. The Commission’s 
authority and responsibility are specified in Wisconsin Statute 
section 62.50, and the Milwaukee City Charter. Revisions to 
policy made July 26, 2001. 
City demographics show 53% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 
Approximately 65.6% of force is 








$7,500 2003  Referred to entity website. 
The city council established the Community and Police 
Relationship Commission.135 
City demographics show 42.2% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 48.1% 
of police force is Caucasian 
                                                 
134 “Independent Police Oversight Board,” City of Houston, accessed April 21, 2015, http://www.houstontx.gov/boards/ipob.html.  












$1,200,000 1980 Ordinance No. 12454 C.M.S. City demographics show 34.5% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 41.8% 
of police force is Caucasian, African 
America officers unrepresented by 10%. 




$150,000 1978 Established in the 1984 Ruth Scott Resolution and the 1992 Police 
Community Relations Program Legislation. 
City demographics show 43.7% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 73.8% 





City and County 
of San 
Francisco, CA,  
$5,127,789 1982  City and County of San Francisco Charter section 4.127 Not provided 
Office of the 
Independent 
Police Auditor 
San Jose, CA 
$1,249,223 1996 Referred to entity website. 
Section 809 of the City Charter establishes the independent police 
auditor.136 
City demographics show 42% of the 
population is “Caucasian only,” 54% of 





                                                 
136 “Charter,” City of San Jose.  
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APPENDIX D.  INDEPENDENCE-BASED QUESTIONS (4, 5, 6) 
Entity Municipality Spurring Event How Independence is 
Maintained 
Type of Entity 
Civilian Review Board  
Baltimore, MD 
Not answered Board is under the Office of Civil 
Rights and Wage Enforcement 
External investigative  
Community Ombudsman Oversight 
Panel Boston, MA 
The department was spurred by the 
emergence of similar panels in other 
cities and by the death that year of an 
area college student who was killed 
by police firing pepper-pellet guns 
during crowd control operations 
following the Red Sox World Series 
victory. 
Members are appointed by the mayor 
for the purpose of promoting 
professionalism within the Boston 
Police Department, and to 
demonstrate that the internal affairs 
process is fair and thorough.  
External review 
Citizens Review Board 
Charlotte, NC 
Not answered  The Citizens Review Board is made 
up of 11 members who are appointed 
by the mayor (3), city manager (3), 
and council (5) all are unpaid 
volunteers.  
External review 
Civilian Police Review Board 
Durham, NC 
The creation of the Civilian Police 
Review Board stemmed from 
concerns that arose in a particular 
litigated matter where the integrity of 
the Durham Police Department 
Professional Standards Division’s 
investigatory process was called into 
question. 
The nine members of the Civilian 
Police Review Board are volunteers 
who apply to serve on the board, are 
appointed by the city manager and 
confirmed by the city council.  
External review 
Office of Independent Review 
Fresno, CA 
It was established in response to a 
public desire to institute some sort of 
civilian oversight. 
Completely independent of the police 
department, but also independent of 
the mayor, city manager and city 
council.  
External review 
Complaint Review Committee  
Greensboro, NC 
No specific event prompted the 
creation of the Complaint Review 
Committee. 
Through legislation External review 
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Entity Municipality Spurring Event How Independence is 
Maintained 
Type of Entity 
Honolulu Police Commission 
Honolulu, HI 
In response to a white Navy lieutenant 
directing two white men to kidnap a 
Hawaiian man suspected of raping the 
lieutenant’s wife. The Navy lieutenant 
admitted to killing the rape suspect 
after obtaining a confession. In early 
1932, an Assistant United States 
Attorney of the Department of Justice, 
Washington, DC conducted an in-
depth survey of conditions in Hawaii, 
and his findings indicated that within 
the police organization there was 
clear evidence of political control and 
the Police Act of 1932 was created.  
The Police Act of 1932 External investigative  
Independent Police Oversight Board 
Houston, TX 
Referred to entity website. No 
incident located.  
Referred to entity website. None 
located.  
External review 
Citizen Police Oversight Commission 
Inglewood, CA 
The “Donovan Jackson” incident.  The only connectivity to Inglewood’s 
police department is that one of the 
eleven commissioners is appointed by 
the chief of police with the other five 
pairs of commissioners are appointed 
by each council member (e.g., the 
mayor and four council members each 
appoint two commissioners).  
External review 
Citizen Police Complaint 
Commission 
Long Beach, CA 
An off duty Hawthorne police officer 
was stopped by Long Beach Police 
Department. During the contact was 
being detained and pushed through a 
window.  
It is required by the city charter, and 
also cannot be in the same building 
and must be off site. 
External investigative  
Fire and Police Commission 
Milwaukee, WI 
The commission was originally 
created to remove the fire and police 
services from the influences of 
politics. 
 
By state law and city charter  By state law and city charter  
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Entity Municipality Spurring Event How Independence is 
Maintained 
Type of Entity 
National City Community and Police 
Relations Commission 
National City, CA 
Referred to entity website. No 
incident located.  
None located. External review 
Citizens’ Police Review Board 
Oakland, CA 
Not a single incident, but a 
progression of events that led to its 
current organizational structure. 
The Citizens’ Police Review Board is 
a separate agency, with its own staff, 
policies, and executive director who 




Civilian Review Board 
Rochester, NY 
In response to the 1976 shooting of an 
African American female, the 1984 
Ruth Scott Resolution 
Is part of the separate non-profit 
Center for Dispute Settlement Police/ 
Community Relations Programs  
External review 
Office of Citizen Complaints 
City and County of San Francisco, 
CA,  
Not answered  Referred to entity website. It is a 
volunteer civilian body nominated by 
elected officials and appointed by the 
politically appointed Police 
Commission.137 
External investigative 
Office of the Independent Police 
Auditor 
San Jose, CA 
Not answered Referred to entity website. Per City 
Ordinance 8.04.020 the police auditor 
shall, at all times, be completely 
independent and requests for further 
investigations, recommendations and 
reports shall reflect the views of the 




                                                 
137 “Frequently Asked Questions: Office of Citizen Complaints,” City and County of San Francisco, accessed August 31, 2015, 
http://sfgov.org/occ/frequently-asked-questions.  
138 “Independence of the Police Auditor,” City of San Jose, accessed August 31, 2015, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?nid=697.  
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APPENDIX E.  COMPLAINT PROCESS-BASED 






















The Civilian Review 
Board provides the 





By filling out and 
signing a form that is 
witnessed by a notary 
public. Use of force 
complaints have a 90-
day window, all other 
complaints are one 
calendar year139  
Three non-
police locations 
Able to investigate 
complaints of 











excessive force” by 
police officers.140  
No adjudication noted 
Inquiry board hearings 












division that allege 
serious misconduct 
and use of force, a 
random sample of 
all other complaints, 
and a random 
Citizens do not file with 
the Community 
Ombudsman Oversight 
Panel and Complaint 
Mediation Program. 
Appeals can be filed 
online, in person, or by 
mail within 14 days of 
judgment.  
Appeals can be 
filed online or 
in person at the 
office  
None Completed cases as 
presented by Boston 
Police Department 
internal affairs that 
allege serious 
misconduct and use 
of force, a random 
sample of all other 
complaints, and a 




                                                 



























due to alleging the 
investigation was 
either not fair for 
not thorough.  
unfounded 
complaints appealed 
due to alleging the 
investigation was 







serves only in an 
advisory capacity to 
the chief of police, 
the city manager and 
the city council. The 
Citizens Review 
Board itself cannot 
take disciplinary 
action against a 
police officer or 
award damages to 
an injured citizen. 
The Citizens 
Review Board only 
can advise the chief 
of police and the 
city manager when 
it becomes clear to 
the Citizens Review 
Board that the 
disciplinary decision 
of the police 
Complaints are taken on 
line takes appeals, in 
person at the office, or 
with internal affairs at 
the Charlotte Police 
Department.  
In office and 
via online. 
None  Certain types of 
alleged misconduct 
by a police officer; or 
the discharge of a 
firearm by an officer 



























The Civilian Police 
Review Board does 
not investigate 
complaints. They 
are only authorized 
to consider Requests 
for Appeal Hearings 
from individuals 
who are not satisfied 
with the outcome of 
the Internal Affairs 
investigation.  
Complaints can be filed 
online or at the Police 
Department, City 
Manager’s Office, or 
Durham One Call.  
Three None  The Civilian Police 
Review Board 
considers cases 
involving 1) Use of 
force, 2) Unethical 
conduct and/or 
conduct unbecoming, 
and 3) Arrest, search, 






The Office of 
Independent Review 
analyzes complaints 
filed by citizens 
with the Police 
Department Internal 
Affairs Division to 






also provides an 
objective analysis of 
individual units 
within the police 
department to 
Complaints can be filed 
with me via a website, 
via the U.S. mail, and 
over the phone. I use a 
complaint form that, as I 
said above, is forwarded 
to the police department 
internal affairs unit.  





Forms are also 
available at five 
non-police 
locations 
None   1) Use of force 2) 
discrimination/ 
profiling allegations 
3) Any allegation of a 
two tiered system of 
punishment within 
the PD itself, 4) Theft 
allegations 5) 
Allegations of drug 
or alcohol abuse and 
6) Any claim of 
undue influence by 
an officer for a 
friend/family 

























with policy and 
procedure, best 
practices and the 
law. This includes 
recommendations on 
findings to increase 
thoroughness, 
quality and accuracy 
of each police unit 
reviewed. 
complaints, or quality 






An external review 
of an internal 
investigation 
Complaints can be filed 
in-person Greensboro 
Police Department or the 
Complaint Review 
Committee, in-person at 
City Hall, by mail, 
electronically via the 
website, by email or 
telephone.  
In office, by 
mail, online, by 
email or phone 
None The Complaint 
Review Committee 
reviews, advises and 
reports on conduct 
concerns of sworn 
police employees; it 
does not investigate 
or adjudicate any 
complaints.  
If a complainant 
review is desired, the 
Human Relations 
Department collects 
all materials that the 
Greensboro Police 
Department used in 
their investigation and 
how the decision was 
made. At the monthly 
review meeting, the 
committee debate the 
issues and facts 
presented in a meeting 
closed to the public. 
The committee makes 
a decision on the case. 
If the committee 
agrees with the 
internal investigation 
and decision they 




















send a determination 
letter to the resident 
explaining why they 
agreed with the police 
department. If the 
committee agrees or 
disagrees with any part 
of the investigation 
and or the decision 
made by the police 
department, it can say 
so and or request the 
chief of police to 
review the case and 







charges brought by 
the public against 
the conduct of the 
department or any of 
its members and 
submit a written 
report of its findings 
to the chief of 
police.  
At the commission 
office, or call to make 
alternate arrangements 
through the outreach 
program. Complaints 
must be filed within 60 
days of the incident.  
As needed an 
investigator will 
meet at a 
residence as 







Referred to entity 
website. Conduct 
towards the public, 
dereliction of duty, 





the report and renders 
a recommendation to 
uphold or deny the 
allegations of the 
complaint. This is 
recorded at an 
executive session. A 
majority opinion, 
consisting of four or 
more votes, 
determines the 
disposition of each 
                                                 




















case. If more 
information is needed 
or if a majority vote is 






Referred to entity 
website. To review 
internal 
investigations, to 




and that proper 
discipline is 
issued.143 
Referred to entity 
website. May be initiated 
in person at police 
headquarters or a 
substation to a 
supervisor, or to Internal 
Affairs/ Central Intake, 
or sending a notarized 
complaint form to 
Central Intake.144  
Referred to 
entity website. 
At any police 
station and 
substation or 







Board does not 
directly accept 
complaints.145  




Referred to entity 
website. Does not 
investigate but 
reviews all internal 
affairs investigations 
involving allegations 
of excessive force or 
the discharge of 
firearms and other 




Answered as an 
individual: I serve as 
the staff advisor to 
A citizen can file a 
complaint by completing 
a complaint form or 
Theoretically, a 
constituent 
could file a 
All complaints that 
warrant an 
investigation are 
The commission does 
not do any 
independent 
The commission does 
not adjudicate cases. 
                                                 


























the Citizen Police 
Oversight 
Commission. I assist 
in the functioning of 
the commission, and 
I passively 
participate in the 
discussions related 
to the complaints 
(e.g., I help them 
understand it). I 
don’t provide my 




sending a letter or some 
other written form of 
correspondence. A 
citizen can also come 
into the police 
department or 
administration and file a 
complaint in person, but 
they still need to write it 
down. We don’t accept 
complaints via phone. 
They can also visit our 








coming to City 
Hall. Since they 
can send us a 
letter also, they 








could violate an 
officer’s Police 









and forward to the 
Long Beach Police 
Department internal 








and a notification 
that the 
investigation has 
begun. Entity has all 
In person at the office, 
through the police 
department complaint 
process, email, fax, and 




spots, but with 
email and fax 
people can file 
from virtually 
anywhere.   
 
The ability to 






The ability to 

























of the investigative 
capability except for 




officers. Conduct a 
parallel 
investigation and 
report findings to 
the police 
department and city 
manager.  
 








up to and including 
termination 
Citizens may file a 
complaint directly with 
the police department or 
fire department. A 
person may file a 
complaint against an 
employee of the fire or 
police department for 
specific acts of 
inappropriate conduct. 
Complaints can be 
initiated in writing, in 
person, by telephone, by 




online and at 
over 15 
locations in the 
community  
Yes  Referred to entity 
website. Fire and 
Police Commission 
staff will conduct an 





administrate hearing to 
determine whether the 
employee violated a 
rule or standard of the 
department.  
                                                 




















the commission website, 


















Referred to entity 
website. Citizens can 
report a complaint to the 
on-duty supervisor at 
any time day or night by 
coming to the National 
City Police Station and 




entity website.  




Referred to entity 
website. Empowered 
to receive and review 
complaints regarding 
National City Police 
Department 




Review Board  
Oakland, CA 
Answered as an 
individual: I am the 
executive director. I 
review all 
complaints and 
assign them to an 
investigator. I also 
coordinate the 
efforts of the 
civilian board, 
A citizen can file a 
complaint by walking 
into our office, internal 
affairs, contacting an 
officer on the street to 
file a complaint, 
telephoning 
communications, our 
office, or internal affairs, 
mailing in a completed 
A citizen can 
file a complaint 




officer on the 
street to file a 
complaint, 
telephoning 
We employ a staff 
of investigators 
who have full 





board has subpoena 
power to call 
Any manual of rules 
violation by a sworn 
member of the 
Oakland Police 
Department. 
We conduct a hearing 
and afterwards the 
board commissioners 
render a decision. The 
decision is then 
presented to the city 
administrator for final 
disposition. The city 
administrator can 
concur with the 
                                                 
149 “Community and Police Relations Commission,” National City, California, accessed July 30 2015, http://www.nationalcityca.gov/index.aspx?page=111.  
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid.  






















process, and all 
personnel matters. 
Per website it is an 
alternate method of 
filing misconduct 
complaints to ensure 
police 
accountability. 
complaint form, or 
faxing in a completed 
complaint form. We 
receive a copy of every 
civilian complaint filed 
with the police 
department regardless of 
whether a complainant 
comes to our agency or 
not.  
commutations, 
our office, or 
internal affairs, 
mailing in a 
completed 
complaint form, 
or faxing in a 
completed 
complaint form. 
We receive a 
copy of every 
civilian 
complaint filed 





comes to our 




seek testimony as 
well. 
decision completely or 
in part, or not at all. 
The city 
administrator’s 









At the Center for Dispute 
Settlement Police 
Complaint Intake.  
Can file with 





None Reviews cases of 
excessive use of 
force, missing 
property, procedural, 
actions that would 


























City and County 
of San 
Francisco, CA,  
Conducts its own 
investigations of 
citizen complaints 




or complaints that 
San Francisco 
Police Department 
members have not 
properly performed 
a duty with the 
exception of 
complaints filed by 
other employees.  
Via phone or in person 
during business hours, or 
fax in or file online at 
any time. Complaints 
filed at any of the police 
stations will be 
forwarded to the Office 
of Citizen Complaints 
for investigation. 




Referred to entity 
website. “By City 
Charter, the Office of 
Citizen Complaints is 
obliged to take every 
complaint of alleged 
police misconduct or 
improper 
performance made by 
a member of the 
public, where the 
complaint involves 








Hearings are held 
following the 
conclusion of an 
Office of Citizen 
Complaints 
investigation at the 
request of the 
complainant or of the 
officer or when, in the 
opinion of the director, 
a hearing would 
facilitate the fact 
finding process.”154  
Office of the 
Independent 
Police Auditor 
San Jose, CA. 
Referred to entity 
website.  
Accepts complaints 
from the public 
about San Jose 
Referred to entity 
website.  
In writing (email, fax, 
mail, or hand delivery) 




may be filed at 
either the IPA 
None Referred to entity 
website.  
Does not investigate, 
only reviews. 
Referred to entity 
website. None 
                                                 
153 “Frequently Asked Questions: Office of Citizen Complaints,” City and County of San Francisco.  






























Can be done 
anonymously.156 









                                                 
155 “Charter,” City of San Jose.  
156 Office of the Independent Police Auditor, Frequently Asked Questions about the IPA Office (San Jose, CA: City of San Jose), 1.  
157 “Complaint Process,” City of San Jose, accessed August 31, 2015, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?nid=700.  
158 “Charter,” City of San Jose.  
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APPENDIX F.  ENTITY COMMUNICATION-BASED 
QUESTIONS (10, 11, 12)     
Entity Municipality How are complaints analyzed for future 
policy development? 
How does your entity communicate 
findings and analysis to police training 
mechanisms for their use and 
dissemination? 
Are lessons learned from completed 
investigations integrated into any 
systemic training in the department? 
Civilian Review Board  
Baltimore, MD 
Not provided.  
“The board shall submit a statement of its 
findings and recommendations to the 
commissioner within 30 days of receipt of 
the Internal Investigations Division 
Report.”159 
Not provided.  
“The board shall submit a statement of its 
findings and recommendations to the 
commissioner within 30 days of receipt of 
the Internal Investigations Division 
Report.”160 
Not provided. 
Not located.  
Community 
Ombudsman Oversight 
Panel Boston, MA 
It makes recommendations to the police 
commissioner, although his decision is final.  
Not provided.  
The ombudsman reviews the internal 
investigation case file and make a 
recommendation. Recommendations by 
the ombudsman and the chief of the 
Bureau of Professional Standards are 




Citizens Review Board 
Charlotte, NC 
The Citizens Review Board only can advise 
the chief of police and the city manager 
when it becomes clear to the Citizens Review 
Board that the disciplinary decision of the 
police department was a serious mistake. 
 
 
Not provided.  
None 
Not answered. 
None located.  
                                                 
159 “Office of Civil Rights and Wage Enforcement / Civilian Review Board / Rules,” City of Baltimore, accessed August 8, 2015, 
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/Government/BoardsandCommissions/OfficeofCivilRightsandWageEnforcement/CivilianReviewBoard/Rules.aspx.  
160 Ibid. 
161 Community Ombudsman Oversight Panel, CO-OP Brochure (Boston, MA: City of Boston).  
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Entity Municipality How are complaints analyzed for future 
policy development? 
How does your entity communicate 
findings and analysis to police training 
mechanisms for their use and 
dissemination? 
Are lessons learned from completed 
investigations integrated into any 
systemic training in the department? 
Civilian Police Review 
Board 
Durham, NC 
They are vetted by the Civilian Police 
Review Board who in turn sends written 
comments/ suggestions to the city manager 
for consideration. 
It is provided to the city manager in 
writing and communicated to the police 
chief if/ when appropriate.  
Yes  
Office of Independent 
Review 
Fresno, CA 
Findings and recommendations are 
transmitted in the following ways: 1) in the 
audit report itself, 2) an early copy of the 
quarterly report and 3) in the publicly posted 
quarterly report. 
 
Policy or training concerns are 
communicated in the publicly posted 
“quarterly report” recommendations to 
remedy the situation discovered. If a policy 
needs to be updated or fixed, it 
communicated that directly to internal 
affairs as soon as it is discovered via the 
audit report.  
Yes, the police department has adopted 
many, if not all, of my recommendations 
to date and did so by providing 
department wide training or changing the 
syllabus’s of upcoming training, if it is a 




Quarterly reports reflecting the professional 
directives of concern, volume of cases and 
review outcomes are published to city 
council. An on-going dialogue exists 
between the Complaint Review Committee 
and the police that is respectful and 
meaningful concerning police policies, 
processes and procedures.  
 
Quarterly reports reflecting the 
professional directives of concern, volume 
of cases and review outcomes are 
published to city council. An on-going 
dialogue exist between the Complaint 
Review Committee and the police that is 
respectful and meaningful concerning 
police policies, processes and procedures. 
Lessons from the reviews, Q10 reflects a 
continued analysis and feedback to the 








Referred to entity website. Reports findings 
to the mayor, chief of police, and Council 
Public Safety Committee.162  
 
 
Referred to entity website. 
None  
Referred to entity website. 
Not located.  
                                                 
162 “Independent Police Oversight Board,” City of Houston.  
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Entity Municipality How are complaints analyzed for future 
policy development? 
How does your entity communicate 
findings and analysis to police training 
mechanisms for their use and 
dissemination? 
Are lessons learned from completed 
investigations integrated into any 




All complaints are routed to the chief of 
police. If the complaint is sustained and 
action is taken against an officer in the form 
of discipline, then the entire department is 
briefed through memo or during briefings. 
The policy unit and the training unit are 
typically then tasked with augmenting 
policies and future training based upon the 
issues that were brought to light. 
 
All complaints are routed to the chief of 
police. If the complaint is sustained and 
action is taken against an officer in the 
form of discipline, then the entire 
department is briefed through memo or 
during briefings. The policy unit and the 
training unit are typically then tasked with 
augmenting policies and future training 
based upon the issues that were brought to 
light. 
  
The policy unit and the training unit are 
typically then tasked with augmenting 
policies and future training based upon 




Long Beach, CA 
Complaints are analyzed for the purpose of 
recommendations and clarifications of 
existing policies and the creation of policies 
by the law enforcement officers.  
Through the city manager to the chief of 
police. Cases appealed that were closed at 
the staff level are or looked at the 
commissioner level, if there is still a 
disagreement on the outcome the city 




Fire and Police 
Commission 
Milwaukee, WI 
Not answered Referred to entity website.  
None located 
Not provided. 
None located.  
National City 
Community and Police 
Relations Commission 
National City, CA 
Referred to entity website. Recommend 
policy changes to the chief of police.163 
Issue reports on an annual basis identifying 
any policy-related issues or quality of 






                                                 
163 “Community & Police Relations Commission.”  
164 National City Community and Police Relations Commission Operating Procedures (National City, CA: City of National City, 2006), 7.  
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Entity Municipality How are complaints analyzed for future 
policy development? 
How does your entity communicate 
findings and analysis to police training 
mechanisms for their use and 
dissemination? 
Are lessons learned from completed 
investigations integrated into any 




I have a policy analyst on staff who reviews 
each investigation to identify policy issues. 
He will then research those issues for best 
practices, examine what is currently being 
done on Oakland Police Department and 
determine if this is a policy matter, training 
matter, issue with understanding community 
or policing or a combination of any of these. 




Civilian Review Board 
Rochester, NY 
Panel may make recommendations on 
training, investigations, and policy.  




Office of Citizen 
Complaints 
City and County of 
San Francisco, CA,  
Not provided.  Referred to entity website. 
Findings are communicated through 
quarterly and annual reports.165 
Referred to entity website. 
Recommendations are made through the 
use of quarterly reports. Unknown if 
they were implemented.166  
Office of the 
Independent Police 
Auditor 
San Jose, CA. 
Referred to entity website. Determining if 
there are policy or training needs based on 
the type of complaint. Compiles a yearend 
report.167  
Referred to entity website. 
In the yearend report.168 
Referred to entity website. 
The Independent Police Auditor makes 
recommendations to San Jose Police 





                                                 
165 “Reports and Statistics—Office of Citizen Complaints,” City and County of San Francisco, accessed July 30, 2015, http://sfgov.org/occ/reports-statistics.  
166 Ibid.  
167 “Ordinance,” City of San Jose.  
168 Ibid.  
169 LaDoris H. Cordell, 2014 IPA Year End Report (San Jose, CA: Independent Police Auditor, City of San Jose, 2015).  
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APPENDIX G.  DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT, CHECKS AND BALANCES-BASED 
QUESTIONS (16, 17, 18) 
Entity municipality What discipline/ punishment 
can your entity recommend? 
What discipline/ punishment can your entity 
impose?  
What is the check and balance your 
entity uses when the head law 
enforcement administrator does not 
agree with your findings or 
recommendation for discipline of 
punishment? 
Civilian Review Board  
Baltimore, MD 





Panel Boston, MA 
N/A Not provided. 
None 
Not provided  
Citizens Review Board 
Charlotte, NC 
N/A  N/A  Not provided  
Civilian Police Review 
Board 
Durham, NC 
None None  The city manger has the final say on all 
personnel matters.  
Office of Independent 
Review  
Fresno, CA 
None  None  If it felt that the chief was too lenient or 
too harsh, the Office of Independent 
Review has the ability to go to the city 
manager and/or mayor and state their 
case. The public and elected officials 




None None If no agreement can be made between 
the chief and the committee, then the 
case goes to the city manager. The city 
manager independently reviews the case 
and makes a decision. That decision is 
final and closes the case. The city 
manager’s decision is reflected in a 
committee determination letter detailing 
the actions of the Complaint Review  
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Entity municipality What discipline/ punishment 
can your entity recommend? 
What discipline/ punishment can your entity 
impose?  
What is the check and balance your 
entity uses when the head law 
enforcement administrator does not 
agree with your findings or 
recommendation for discipline of 
punishment? 






Cases referred to the police 
department  
None  





Referred to entity website. 
None located. 
Referred to entity website.  
None located. 
 
Referred to entity website. 
Members are appointed by the 
mayor.170   
Citizen Police 
Oversight Commission  
Inglewood, CA 
The commission can recommend 
anything, but it’s non-binding. 
The commission cannot impose any 
discipline/punishment. 
Since the commission’s recommendation 
is non-binding, the chief of police can 





Long Beach, CA 
None None  The city manager as the supervisor of the 
head law enforcement officer is the 
check and balance if recommendations 
are ignored. 
Fire and Police 
Commission 
Milwaukee, WI 
The commission can suspend, 
demote, or discharge department 
members from employment. 
Up to and including termination Referred to entity website. 
None located. 
National City 
Community and Police 
Relations Commission 
National City, CA 
Referred to entity website.  
None 
Referred to entity website.  
None 








None Consultation with the city manager. The 
city administrator’s decision is final.  
                                                 
170 “Independent Police Oversight Board,” City of Houston.  
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Entity municipality What discipline/ punishment 
can your entity recommend? 
What discipline/ punishment can your entity 
impose?  
What is the check and balance your 
entity uses when the head law 
enforcement administrator does not 
agree with your findings or 
recommendation for discipline of 
punishment? 
Civilian Review Board 
Rochester, NY 
None None Consultation with the city administrator 
Office of Citizen 
Complaints 
City and County of 
San Francisco, CA,  
Referred to entity website. 
None  
Referred to entity website. 
None 
Referred to entity website. 
In any instance where the Office of 
Citizen Complaints sustains a complaint 
and transmits it to the Police Department 
with a recommendation that discipline be 
imposed, and the chief of police has 
failed to act within 45 days from the date 
of transmittal, the secretary to the Police 
Commission shall place the sustained 
complaint on the agenda for the next 
regularly scheduled meeting of the 
police commission, consistent with 
applicable laws governing notice of 
public meetings.  
At this meeting, the police commission 
shall inquire into the status of the 
complaint and any reasons for the delay 
on the part of the chief of police.  
The commission shall require that the 
chief of police provide an explanation 
for the delay in acting upon the 
complaint, and shall impose a deadline 
not to exceed 14 calendar days from the 
date of the meeting by which the chief of 
police shall act on the complaint, unless 
the police commission finds good cause 
for a reasonable extension in excess of 
14 calendar days, and the chief of police 




Entity municipality What discipline/ punishment 
can your entity recommend? 
What discipline/ punishment can your entity 
impose?  
What is the check and balance your 
entity uses when the head law 
enforcement administrator does not 
agree with your findings or 
recommendation for discipline of 
punishment? 
will not preclude the imposition of 
discipline pursuant to California 
Government Code Section 3304.171  
 
Office of the 
Independent Police 
Auditor 
San Jose, CA 
None 
Referred to entity website. 
None 
Referred to entity website. 
 
Referred to entity website. 





                                                 
171 San Francisco Administrative Code Chapter 96: Coordination between the Police Departments and the Office of Citizen Complaints (San Francisco: 
City and County of San Francisco, 2003).  
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